nuclear-news

USA Defense experts give unwise advice on new generation nuclear weapons

Beware the Nuclear Experts, Defense News,  By James Doyle, an independent nuclear security specialist supported by the Ploughshares Fund and non-resident associate of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. August 20, 2015 In their July 13 Defense News commentary, Clark Murdock and Thomas Karako advocate a mobilization of America’s nuclear weapons industry to build a new generation of forward-deployed, low-yield nuclear weapons.  Their commentary is a summary of recommendations from their “Project Atom” study recently completed at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). America should think twice before heeding the advice of these so-called nuclear experts.

Nuclear deterrence is risky business to be sure, but Murdock and Karako’s recommendations suffer two fundamental flaws: They ignore the lessons of history and neglect a fundamental requirement of nuclear strategy. That requirement is the need to assess how America’s nuclear weapon deployments will be perceived by her potential nuclear-armed adversaries.

With respect to Murdock and Karako’s recommendation that the United States develop and deploy additional “tactical” nuclear weapons to its NATO allies, it is critical to remember that we have been down this road before. We know that deployments such as those proposed by the CSIS study can increase rather than decrease the risk of nuclear war by miscalculation.

In the early 1980s the United States deployed the stealthy nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) to the UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Italy, and the highly accurate Pershing II nuclear ballistic missile to Germany.

These deployments, ostensibly in response to the Soviet Union’s deployment of its SS-20 nuclear ballistic missile, came at a time of high tensions between Washington and Moscow. The GLCMs and Pershing II together provided the US and NATO the theoretical potential to launch a nuclear strike destroying the Soviet political and military leadership in eight to 10 minutes from the time the Pershings were fired.

This led the Soviets to believe that they could only inflict similar nuclear damage on the West if they launched their nuclear forces immediately following the reception of warning of a NATO nuclear attack, but before the incoming NATO and American nuclear weapons detonated on their forces.

This need to “launch on warning” under extreme time constraints is the classic definition of lowering the nuclear threshold, not raising it, as is desired….

The idea of “controlling nuclear escalation” in Europe or any other nuclear-armed region was discredited decades ago. As the authors admit, “the distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is long obsolete and any use of a nuclear weapon could have profound strategic effects.”………

The fundamental basis of nuclear strategy is not only to be prepared to retaliate to a nuclear attack but also to see the balance of nuclear forces through the eyes of your potential nuclear-armed adversaries.   In other words, in the nuclear age your adversaries’ sense of security becomes your concern.

No side prevails in a nuclear exchange. Both will suffer consequences that far outweigh any advantage that was sought by their initial use. Only the maintenance of a strategic dialog, serious efforts to reduce tensions and the establishment of operational and diplomatic means to resolve periodic crises can avoid nuclear war. These are the essential lessons of the Cold War……….

The real danger is when both sides lack an understanding of the mentality of the other. Deploying another generation of mini-nukes as urged by the “Project Atom” report without seeking to improve this understanding through diplomatic means will make nuclear war more likely. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/08/20/beware-nuclear-experts/32083997/

August 24, 2015 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA, weapons and war