nuclear-news

The Minuteman missile was once a critical component of a so-called nuclear Triad composed of land-based ICBMs, nuclear-armed bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The value of the Minuteman III to the Triad today centers on the fact that any potential enemy would have to employ hundreds, if not thousands, of nuclear weapons to neutralize it – in short, the Minuteman III exists to serve as a nuclear sump in a world where the risk of massive nuclear attack is slim to none. It is this sort of mind-numbing reality that has led to professional atrophy within the ranks of the US Air Force personnel who man the Minuteman III launch control centers, resulting in flagging morale, lax accountability and cheating scandals.

Nuclear deterrence today is not what it was thirty years ago. The Minuteman’s raison d’être was always survivability against a Soviet nuclear attack. In the post-Soviet era, Russia has emerged as the preeminent nuclear challenger to the United States. But the Russian strategic nuclear force is but a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. The threat of a Russian nuclear surprise attack today is minimal, and ably deterred by the US Navy’s Trident submarine missile force. Furthermore, the inability of the Minuteman III to respond to anything but a massive nuclear attack further reduces its viability as a weapon system capable of implementing the nuclear strategy of the United States today, where quick-reaction, short-duration nuclear contingencies favor the kind of operational flexibility offered by manned bombers and submarines.

Rather than the force of stability it once was, the Minuteman III has become a destabilizing presence — any use of the missile, whether against North Korea, Iran or other rogue state or non-state players, would likely trigger a “launch on detect” response from Russia or China (or both). And its inherent first-strike capability has bred new generations of Russian and Chinese missiles designed solely to target the Minuteman III in its silos, increasing the possibility of inadvertent nuclear conflict rather than diminishing it.

The inescapable fact is that the Minuteman III today is a missile without a mission whose continued operational deployment represents neither sound military doctrine nor responsible fiscal policy — whether or not the missiles are “de-alerted.” The realities associated with current and projected defense expenditures dictate that eventually the Minuteman III will find its way to the budgetary chopping block. It would be better for all involved that this decision be made now, before many billions of dollars are needlessly expended on a weapons system with no viable future. America’s national security deserves nothing less.