nuclear-news

The regime in Tehran has consistently stressed Iran’s opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, primarily on religious grounds – Supreme Leader Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is held up as evidence of this position.

However, there is widespread agreement that Iran’s nuclear activities extend well beyond what is necessary to meet their civil nuclear needs.

Inevitably, Iran’s nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that, at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a ‘proliferation cascade’ in the Middle East.

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons – whatever form that scenario may take — its regional rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, we find that the counter-argument is more compelling…….

proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in 2006 following North Korea’s nuclear test.

The flawed logic of ‘proliferation begets proliferation’ is clearly demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea’s nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatile relations.

In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in dissuading these countries from going nuclear.

Ironically, the Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear proliferation is not inevitable. Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israel acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and over four decades later still remains the only nuclear power in the region……

In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear restraint in the cases of other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons — in December 2011, following the United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia’s Patriot missile defence system, for example – to facilitating increased integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear weapons.

Ultimately, many see a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation. But when the stakes are this high, it is important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there is substantial evidence to suggest that regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.

Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship between nuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy-making.

 http://www.businessinsider.com/nuclear-iran-wouldnt-trigger-arms-race-2012-12#ixzz2FkYB8fJb