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Iran’s strategic environment is such that it makes the decision by Iran’s policy makers to acquire nuclear weapons appear rational both to themselves and to the wider Iranian public.

Can the world live with a near-nuclear Iran?, By Mohammed Ayoob,  December 14, 2011 — (CNN) –– Some analysts have attributed the recent downing of a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel high-altitude reconnaissance drone in Iran to that nation’s increasingly sophisticated capability to
launch cyber attacks. Others have dismissed the idea that Iran was capable of bringing down an RQ-170, arguing that Iranian air defenses do not have the capability to track an aircraft with radar-evadingtechnology.

Either way, the incident clearly demonstrates American concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear capacity, as the drone was likely sent over Iranian territory to spy on its nuclear program.

I find the argument that Iran is engaged in developing a nuclear weapons program credible. I am also convinced that Iran will not test a device, but rather will acquire the capability to produce a weapon quickly if its strategic environment deteriorates to such an extent
that it feels it must.

I am further convinced that an Israeli or American strike or strikes against its nuclear facilities would put Iran’s nuclear program back by a few years but would not be able to terminate it. In fact, such strikes would provide Tehran with the legitimacy to go ahead and
acquire nuclear weapons capability in full view of the world and with international sympathy.

It is time for world leaders to recognize the inevitability of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability, even if it remains untested, with Tehran following the policy and adopting the rhetoric of deliberate ambiguity. Moreover, the major powers that act as the
self-appointed guardians of the current international nuclear order
need to recognize that treaties and other legal documents are not the
primary determinants when it comes to state decisions regarding
acquisition of nuclear capability. It is a country’s strategic
environment that principally determines such a decision.

Iran’s strategic environment is such that it makes the decision by
Iran’s policy makers to acquire nuclear weapons appear rational both
to themselves and to the wider Iranian public. This is why leading
opposition figures are as opposed to suspending uranium enrichment as
regime hard-liners. The foremost opposition presidential candidate,
Mir-Hossein Moussavi, in an interview with the Financial Times in the
run-up to the elections in 2009, stated categorically: “No one in Iran
would accept suspension.”

The strategic rationality of such a policy was recognized in a candid
moment by none other than Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak…..
Given the near-certainty that Iran is launched on an irreversible
course for nuclear weapons capacity, there are only two strategies
that can be used — if not to stop the nuclear program, then at least
to make it less threatening to American interests. The first is for
the United States to actively promote the idea of a nuclear
weapon-free zone (NWFZ) for the Middle East that would include both
Israel and Iran. Iran has supported calls for a NWFZ for several
years, most recently at a Nuclear Disarmament Conference it hosted in
April 2010, as long as it included Israel as well as Iran.
However, promoting a NWFZ in the Middle East does not appear realistic
for the United States in the short run because Israel is stubbornly
opposed to it before a permanent solution is found to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, domestic constraints,
including a highly pro-Israel Congress, would not allow the U.S.
administration to seriously pursue this course.
The other option is to accept Iran’s status as a near-nuclear power
and engage it in substantive discussions about the future architecture
of regional security in the broader Middle East, and more specifically
in the Persian Gulf, where Iran is the indispensable power. This would
entail a drastic revision of the current American strategy of
isolating and quarantining Iran, and replacing it with one that
accommodates Iran’s regional aspirations and attempts to find areas of
convergence rather than confrontation with Tehran. The American
approach to India in the 1990s and the 2000s could form the model for
such a policy.
Such a change of course is likely to pose a major but not insuperable
challenge to American policy makers,
given the current atmosphere of mutual hostility surrounding
Washington’s relations with Tehran. It would require creative
diplomacy on the part of the White House and the State Department,
including signaling Iran that the United States recognizes its
pre-eminent status in the Persian Gulf region (much as Washington did
with India in South Asia) and the legitimate role that goes with it.
It will also mean reducing the paranoia currently afflicting Iran’s
policy makers because of their fear of encirclement by nuclear powers.
If this means that the international community has to learn to live
with a near-nuclear Iran, then this is the price it must be willing to
pay for stability and security in this crucial region.
As recent experience has demonstrated, economic sanctions and military
threats are only likely to stiffen the Iranian resolve to acquire
nuclear weapons as well as to act as the “spoiler” not only in the
energy-rich Persian Gulf but also in the strategically important
broader Middle East region. Furthermore, American hostility toward
Iran reinforces the domestic legitimacy of the Iranian regime and
discredits the democratic opposition, an outcome that is not in the
long-term interest of the United States.
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/14/opinion/ayoob-iran-nulcear/index.html