nuclear-news

Steps for USA and Russia towards nuclear disarmament

There is, however, some unfinished business concerning the 20 year-old Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI’s)  that both governments could take up now to help lay the foundation for future talks.

the United States and Russia have grown accustomed to sharing considerable information about their longer-range strategic nuclear forces. For years, they have routinely exchanged and updated information on the disposition of retiring nuclear-capable bombers and
missiles. Similar processes could be applied to the types and numbers of tactical nuclear systems affected by the P.N.I.’s. 

The next logical step would be for both countries to disclose, on a reciprocal basis, the location, types and numbers of tactical nuclear weapons that remain.

Unfinished Business, NYT, FRANK KLOTZ, SUSAN KOCH and FRANKLIN MILLER December 13, 2011“……..the subject of reducing tactical nuclear weapons has again come to the fore. Signing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010, President Obama announced that the United States intended to pursue further reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons — including, for the first time, tactical and nondeployed warheads. Voting to approve the treaty, the U.S. Senate called for negotiations with Russia to address the
disparity in U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons and to secure and reduce those weapons in a verifiable manner.

The specific size of that disparity is a matter of debate. Neither the United States nor Russia has publicly disclosed the number and locations of the tactical nuclear weapons they possess.

Unofficial estimates vary widely. The London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies credits the United States with 500
operational warheads, with fewer than half of those deployed in
Europe. The 2009 report of the bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture
Commission cited reports that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical
nuclear warheads, plus numerous reserves. Although others offer
different estimates, Russian weapons clearly outnumber U.S. weapons by
an overwhelming margin.

As the United States and Russia continue to reduce long-range,
strategic nuclear weapons to increasingly lower levels, this disparity
in tactical nuclear weapons looms larger, with potentially serious
implications for the overall nuclear balance between the two countries
and the continued efficacy of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for its
allies.

Moreover, Russian military doctrine and public statements by senior
Russian officers suggest that Moscow places high value on a large
tactical nuclear force for deterrence and potential escalation in
military conflicts.
Negotiating a reduction in tactical and nondeployed nuclear weapons
won’t be easy. There are serious technical challenges related to
verifying compliance, and U.S.-Russian differences on a range of
strategic issues, especially missile defenses, cloud the prospects for
“getting to yes” in formal negotiations anytime soon.

There is, however, some unfinished business concerning the 20 year-old
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI’s)  that both governments could
take up now to help lay the foundation for future talks.

The U.S. government has been quite open about the steps taken to
implement the P.N.I.’s. The day after Bush’s announcement, the
Pentagon provided a very detailed account of the number and types of
American tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad and on ships. More
recently, in May 2010, the United States made public the actual size
of its nuclear weapons stockpile for each year since 1962, as well as
the specific number of weapons dismantled annually since 1994.

The Russians have been far less forthcoming. As a result, serious
questions have existed almost from the outset about Russian
implementation of the P.N.I.’s, as well as the role of tactical
nuclear weapons in their military strategy.

By way of contrast, the United States and Russia have grown accustomed
to sharing considerable information about their longer-range strategic
nuclear forces. For years, they have routinely exchanged and updated
information on the disposition of retiring nuclear-capable bombers and
missiles. Similar processes could be applied to the types and numbers
of tactical nuclear systems affected by the P.N.I.’s. Lingering doubts
about actual implementation would be reduced; the overall relationship
would benefit from greater openness.

The next logical step would be for both countries to disclose, on a
reciprocal basis, the location, types and numbers of tactical nuclear
weapons that remain. This should pose few problems for the United
States and its allies; well-informed accounts of deployed American
weapons have been around for years. But disclosing such data might
prove difficult for Russia, given its penchant for secrecy and the
political risks of confirming it does indeed possess a far greater
number of these weapons.

If such difficulties can be overcome, these two steps would enhance
transparency and mutual confidence. In the process, they could help
pave the way to future negotiations on reducing both tactical and
nondeployed nuclear weapons.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/opinion/unfinished-business.html?_r=2&ref=atomicweapons

December 15, 2011 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, Reference, Russia, USA, weapons and war