The (South) Korean Nuclear Threat

13 APR 2023, By Dr Jeffrey Robertson, Australian Institute of International Affairs

South Korea is in the midst of a debate to secure nuclear weapons and few outside realise the seriousness and level of the debate. Few inside realise the question is much bigger than just South Korea, with great implications for the region, including Australia. 

Debate on securing an independent nuclear weapons capacity once sat on the fringe of mainstream politics in Seoul. The extreme left and right, ex-military, religionists, and mavericks seeking attention were its champions. This is no longer the case. Today it is widely accepted, even common. Polls taken over the last year put public support in the 70-80 percent range. Securing nuclear weapons is now mainstream, viable, and if trends continue, even likely.

What makes South Korea want nuclear weapons? There’s a ready response from those pushing the agenda. North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and concerns regarding a rising China. Each can readily be used to justify the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Yet, each are just squalls on the surface of the sea. Underneath, more powerful currents are pushing the pursuit of nuclear weapons: national pride, the desire to be more independent, and a healthy dose of domestic political opportunism.

National pride is a core contributor to the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. For both Koreas, there’s a keen sense of historical injustice marked by invasions from all sides, including occupation, and division. For South Koreans, there’s also a competitive streak that stretches from the individual to the national desire to be number one. There’s even speculation that the U.S. would be willing to allow Seoul to secure nuclear weapons in order for it to play a larger role in balancing China, placing South Korea at a new level of partnership with Washington. Among many, securing a nuclear weapons capacity provokes a certain element of national pride: more than just a middle power – a member of the nuclear weapons club.

The desire to be more independent is also an important contributing factor……………………………..

Domestic political opportunism is the icing on the cake…………………………… The current president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has made remarks supporting the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the Mayor of Seoul – a position that is a stepping stone to the presidency – has also stated his support. Nuclear weapons will see multiple candidates jump on the bandwagon in the lead-up to the April 2024 legislative elections, and likely more than one candidate in the 2027 presidential elections.

Proliferation, from France to North Korea, is a story of national pride, independence, and political opportunism. South Korea is no different.

t is likely the consequences of this momentous decision to pursue an independent nuclear weapons capacity have not been fully thought through. ………………………………..

n the 1960s, Australia made the decision to forego nuclear weapons in the context of a global diplomatic and strategic understanding that proliferation could be controlled. Since that time, debates about Australia securing nuclear weapons have arisen, but they’ve never been mainstream. Debates in recent years have been more brain-storming and speculation than serious policy-specific programming. A South Korean decision to pursue nuclear weapons would substantially transform strategic outlooks across the region and lead to a more serious debate in Australia. The current nuclear submarine debate would look like a Sunday School picnic.

Jeffrey Robertson is an Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies at Yonsei University and a Visiting Fellow at the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne. He researches the diplomatic practice and foreign policy of middle powers with a focus on the Korean Peninsula. He writes and updates research at https://junotane.com and on Twitter @junotane.  https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-south-korean-nuclear-threat/

April 13, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Sung-Hee Choi reports on U.S.-NATO military expansion in South Korea.

This aggressive military expansion, labeled the ‘Asia Pivot’ by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is creating major tensions in the region as the US prepares for war with China, North Korea and Russia.

During the interview Sung-Hee talks about the US Navy destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG-115) that recently ported at the Navy base in Gangjeong village on Jeju. She shares a short video of a protest held at the base as the destroyer crew members were bussed to a hotel outside of the village.

The DDG 115 was built in Bath, Maine and during the ‘Christening’ of the warship in 2015 several members of the peace community from across the state were arrested for non-violently blocking the streets and entrances surrounding the shipyard as the public was invited to attend the ceremony. (Regular peace vigils are held at Bath Iron Works in Maine where these destroyers are built. Currently there are seven more under construction.)

There has long been a connection between Maine and the activists in Gangjeong village.  Over the years eight Maine-based activists (as well as hundreds of other international peaceniks) traveled to the village to join protests against the Navy base construction that was forced on South Korea by Washington.

In another part of the interview Sung-Hee reports on recent (and on-going) US-NATO war games aimed at North Korea. She shares a second short video of protests in Seoul opposing these war games.

Near the end of the interview Sung-Hee talks about how the US Space Force has assigned personnel to South Korea and is drawing their nation into the larger US program of militarizing space.

March 24, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment

North Korea test-fires four missiles to show ability to launch nuclear attack

Guardian, 24 Feb 23,

Strategic cruise missiles hit a target after travelling 2,000km, says state media, to demonstrate ‘war posture’ of nuclear force.

North Korea test-fired four strategic cruise missiles during a drill designed to demonstrate its ability to conduct a nuclear counterattack against hostile forces, its state media said.

The exercise on Thursday involved an apparently operational strategic cruise missile unit of the Korean people’s army, which fired the four Hwasal-2 missiles in the area of Kim Chaek city, North Hamgyong province, towards the sea off the east coast of the Korean peninsula, the news agency KCNA said. Other units conducted firepower training at hardened sites without live firing.

The four strategic cruise missiles hit a preset target after travelling the “2,000km-long [1,243-mile] elliptical and eight-shaped flight orbits for 10,208 seconds to 10,224 seconds”, the English-language report said.

The drill demonstrated “the war posture of the DPRK nuclear combat force bolstering up in every way its deadly nuclear counterattack capability against the hostile forces”, KCNA said…………………………. more https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/north-korea-test-fires-four-missiles-to-show-ability-to-launch-nuclear-attack

February 25, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment

South Korea’s Nuclear Flirtations Highlight the Growing Risks of Allied Proliferation

Carnegie Endowment, ERIC BREWER,  TOBY DALTON, FEBRUARY 13, 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s January comments about his country possibly acquiring nuclear weapons adds to the mounting nuclear dangers in Asia. Though he subsequently walked back his statement, the underlying motives and risks remain that South Korea could one day decide to go nuclear.

Yoon’s nuclear threat also fueled a debate among security experts in Washington about how to respond. Many nonproliferation analysts highlighted the rarity of national leaders making public allusions to acquiring nuclear weapons and argued that the United States needs to remind South Korea of its commitments not to do so. Others highlighted the dangers of a rising tide of “nuclear populism” that is driving South Korea’s nuclear discourse.  Conversely, some analysts argued that there is little the United States can do to prevent an inevitable South Korean weapon and that it is better to reduce U.S. extended deterrence commitments in conflicts that exceed vital U.S. interests. A few go even further and suggest that Washington should welcome or even facilitate a nuclear-armed Seoul.

This debate indicates a very unsettled dynamic that American and other policymakers cannot wish away or ignore. Yoon’s comments may simply be the leading edge of a trend in nuclear flirtations by U.S. allies and partners.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has sought to stem the spread of nuclear weapons to adversaries and allies alike. This policy aims partly to preserve the U.S. nuclear advantage and to reduce the potential that nuclear weapons are used, which many experts judge increases if more states acquire them. Over the past few decades, the major proliferation fear has been about rogue actors: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, or potentially terrorist groups. The United States and the international community developed a policy tool kit to address these threats, including sanctions, technology denial, and even cyber and military attacks on nuclear facilities. Today, however, an increasing proliferation risk comes from U.S. allies and partners worried about their security and the credibility of U.S. commitments to their defense…………………………………….more https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/89015?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss

February 13, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The Disastrous Downsides of South Korea Building Nuclear Weapons

38 North BY: SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, JANUARY 20, 2023

Is South Korea Willing to Lose Its World-leading Nuclear Power Program to Build the Bomb?

In a wide-ranging interview on January 11, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol warned Pyongyang that if North Korea’s nuclear threat continues to advance, South Korea would consider building nuclear weapons of its own or ask the United States to redeploy them on the Korean Peninsula. Although President Yoon walked back these comments at the World Economic Forum in Davos, they were published in the South Korean press and reinforced by some Republic of Korea (ROK) defense analysts. Cheon Seong-whun said, “President Yoon’s comment could turn out to be a watershed moment in the history of South Korea’s national security.”

A South Korean decision to build its own bomb could, indeed, be a watershed. Threatening Pyongyang does little besides give it a stronger justification to enhance its own nuclear arsenal. I believe that such a move would trigger a tsunami that would wipe out Seoul’s remarkable economic miracle and destroy the soft power it has established around the world……………………….

The National Burden of a Nuclear Arsenal

Whereas President Yoon’s comment, “…we can have our own nuclear weapons pretty quickly, given our scientific and technological capabilities” is true, it doesn’t come close to capturing the national redirection, expense, and immense burden that Seoul would have to shoulder to field not just one bomb, but a nuclear arsenal to counter Pyongyang’s.

It is true that with its advanced technological capabilities, South Korea could probably build the bomb quickly. But a few bombs don’t make a nuclear deterrent, particularly if Seoul will have to go it alone. And let’s be clear, if Seoul were to go down this path, Washington could, and likely would, withdraw its nuclear umbrella. Building a nuclear arsenal to counter Pyongyang’s would require a major national redirection of its economy and diplomacy that would negatively affect nearly all facets of South Korean life for decades.

For nearly fifty years, South Korea has pursued a civilian nuclear energy program. It wisely focused on the middle of the fuel cycle—that is, reactor fuel fabrication, reactor construction and operation, and electricity production. It has built neither enrichment nor reprocessing facilities. Consequently, South Korea has no inventory of bomb-grade plutonium or uranium currently stockpiled. To build nuclear weapons, it would have to repurpose some of its civilian reactors to produce the plutonium bomb fuel (combined with using its laboratory-scale pyroprocessing facilities to extract plutonium) or construct a centrifuge facility to make highly enriched uranium. Either path would take at least two years to produce enough bomb fuel for even a few bombs. In the longer term, an effective nuclear deterrent would require new, dedicated nuclear weapons facilities, requiring substantial time and financial commitments.

The next step in building a bomb is weaponization—that is, designing, building and testing the nuclear devices. South Korea could surely master all scientific and engineering challenges of building a bomb—as it has demonstrated so convincingly in mastering civilian nuclear power generation. Some of the purely military aspects could be accomplished in concert with its conventional military technical complex. But to prove the design and fabrication, there would need to be nuclear testing, but where? Neighboring countries—China and Japan—would certainly object strongly, and there would undoubtedly be strong domestic opposition to tests from every South Korean province.

The nuclear warheads will also have to be integrated into delivery vehicles—such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles or bombers. South Korea has all the basic building blocks, but it would still have substantial work to do to integrate the nuclear warheads into the delivery systems. Moreover, these requirements will continue to evolve as North Korea upgrades its offensive and defensive capabilities. The assembly, disassembly and fielding of nuclear devices pose serious safety and security risks and would have to be learned without help or advice from current nuclear powers. Seoul will also have to develop a command-and-control structure that is more stringent than anything it has done so far for its conventional military.

Another consequence of building a nuclear arsenal is that it will compete for resources—financial, personnel, and technical—with the South’s conventional military…………………………………………………………………………

Seoul Would Deal a Serious Blow to the Nonproliferation Regime

South Korea would be the first democratic country to withdraw from the NPT, dealing a blow to decades of US leadership in preventing nuclear proliferation. As serious as the North Korean nuclear threat is, I believe Washington would have no choice but to condemn and counter the South’s decision to build the bomb. The nonproliferation regime is a complex fabric of treaties, agreements, assurances, practices, and international organizations. North Korea’s bomb and Iran’s pursuit of the bomb have already stressed the regime. The negative impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are playing out now. South Korea should not join these countries in undermining the regime……………………………………………………………

Shooting Itself in the Foot

South Korea’s decision to build the bomb will be widely condemned…………………………..

The irony is that an indigenous nuclear arsenal will make South Korea less secure. It is likely to draw an escalatory response from the North, and Seoul may then have to face that threat on its own. ………………………………. more https://www.38north.org/2023/01/the-disastrous-downsides-of-south-korea-building-nuclear-weapons/

January 22, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The US has a new nuclear proliferation problem: South Korea

The US has a new nuclear proliferation problem: South Korea. Last week,
Seoul officially put its nuclear option on the table, for the first time
since 1991. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared the country would
consider building its own arsenal of nuclear weapons if the threat it faces
from nuclear-armed North Korea continues to grow. It will.

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 19th Jan 2023

January 21, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment