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Europe: carelessness, cowardice or concealment of radiation accidents? CRIIRAD report #IAEA #UNSCEAR

“At the European level, to our knowledge, no instructions have been given to mobilize the networks of measurements and analytical laboratories; no official information has been released; no warning has addressed to European nationals traveling or residing in regions potentially at risk.” CRIIRAD

“All lessons must be learned from these dysfunctions both at European and international level so that opacity and indifference do not preside over the management of the next nuclear disaster.”

The rapid notification system for nuclear accidents set up after the Chernobyl disaster is in total failure. We still do not know which facility is causing the contamination. We do not know how many workers, how many inhabitants, how many children were exposed to radiation; how many were contaminated; what doses of radiation they were able to receive … But all is well, since in Europe ruthenium levels 106 remained very low!

The World Health Organization (WHO) continues to be silent: no warning, no warning, no request investigation was launched by the WHO Office for Europe, whose expertise extends from Greenland to Siberia, including the States singled out by official simulations, including the Russian Federation.

In blue the area is under the WHO Office for Europe.
The International Atomic Energy Agency turns away the eye and attention: no position taken despite its responsibilities under the International Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents!
No call for investigation. On the contrary: the publication of a document “for authorities’ use only” which focuses on the absence of any risk in Europe, deliberately obscuring the situation in the rejection! And what about the tables of results produced in the appendix? Clearly erroneous data and other which contradict the simulations of the IRSN without anyone worrying! Can not check anything because the results of analyzes, yet paid by the taxpayers of the countries concerned, are not free to access!

CRIIRAD challenges the World Health Organization
Read the mail of 17/11/2017
CRIIRAD wrote this day to Mrs JAKAD, Director of the WHO European Office, to ask for explanations of the total silence of this body in a file likely to pose significant health problems. according to the IRSN rating of 9/11/2017, experts from several countries agree on the importance of radioactive release 1. He would have/may require:

1 / the implementation of protective measures such as confinement or evacuation in a
radius of 5 km around the site of emission and

2 / the control of the contamination of the food up to 40 km of distance.

Recall that the authorities have set particularly high dose levels for triggering
these emergency measures. If official estimates are correct, areas requiring protective measures extend well beyond these perimeters.
How has WHO been able to remain silent and can it remain so today? Why did not she
alerted to the need to act very quickly in case of atmospheric contamination? Why did not she explain that exposure levels in the discharge zone have nothing to do with what can be measured at 1,000 or 2,000 km from distance? Why has it not reminded the States likely to be at the origin of the rejection that everything must be put in
to identify the facility in question and limit exposures? Does not its constitution stipulate that governments have responsibility for the health of their peoples?
1
According to IRSN calculations, the ruthenium 106 release would be between 100 and 300 TBq. This radionuclide is necessarily in equilibrium with its short-lived descendant Rhodium 106, also radioactive, and could be accompanied by ruthenium 103 (radio-
nuclide detected at very low levels in Sweden). The absence of any other radionuclide remains to be demonstrated, in particular (but not only) in the rejection sector.

We can only note, once again, the total erasure of this agency when the nuclear power is in cause. One can only wonder again about the consequences of the agreement which binds WHO to the IAEA, forces it to to deal with the statutory mission of the latter, which is to ensure the development of civilian nuclear energy.
It was necessary to intervene without delay because the exposures are major in the first days and the first weeks but there is still time to act. CRIIRAD calls on WHO to make every effort to determine what is happened and to provide the victims with all the help they need.

CRIIRAD challenges the International Atomic Energy Agency
Read the mail of 17/11/2017
CRIIRAD is surprised by the absence of any public position taken by the IAEA while the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 2 are clearly violated. She asked that the IAEA carry out, or cause to be carried out, all the investigations necessary to identify the origin of the contamination.

CRIIRAD also denounces the content of the documents that the IAEA has written “for the exclusive use of the authorities”: the “Status of Measurements of Ru-106 in Europe” press release and its technical annex presenting the measures
transmitted to the IAEA until 13/10/2017. The IAEA totally obscures the question of the origin of the contamination and the risks incurred on the spot!

Moreover, the agency’s assessments of the situation in Europe leave no room for no worry: according to her, the implementation of protective measures would be justified only after one dose 100 mSv in 7 days! Gold:

1 / the value of 100 mSv corresponds to the upper limit of the range of 20 to 100 mSv recommended by the ICRP, and chosen by the European Union, for the management of nuclear accidents;

2 / the application of values ​​above 20 mSv would only be justified in the event of a major nuclear accident in Europe.
For the impact of a long-range accident, populations must demand that the level of radiological risk exceeds that defined for normal situations, which is already high enough, ie 1 mSv / year.
In addition, the 11 pages of results published in the appendix contain clearly erroneous statements. For some results, there is confusion between the date of air sampling and the date of publication of the results. By elsewhere, the table shows that contamination reached Budapest on 25 September at the latest. But there is more 2,500 km between central Hungary and the area that the IRSN simulation designates with the strongest probability (60 to 80%) as the source of the release. It is highly unlikely that the contamination could cross such a distance in 24 hours. A delay of 3 or 4 days would be more logical but it puts in question the modelizations who place the date of rejection in the last week of September.
The IAEA must also specify the arguments on which it relies to remove the runway from a powered satellite by a source of ruthenium 106. The official models are based on the assumption that this origin is excluded on the basis of IAEA declarations but no supporting text has been published.

Europe: carelessness, cowardice or concealment?
At the European level, to our knowledge, no instructions have been given to mobilize the networks of measurements and analytical laboratories; no official information has been released; no warning has addressed to European nationals traveling or residing in regions potentially at risk.
Can we imagine that no investigation has been launched, despite the means available, to go back to source of contamination, at least to validate or invalidate certain assumptions?

Can we believe that embassies have not been solicited? That no sample was taken? Is it possible that measurements were made of aircraft that flew over suspicious installations such as those Mayak?

That could have been done 30 years ago, for Chernobyl, and even earlier for the control of fallout nuclear tests! Are European states guilty of inaction? Did they prefer not to know? Or do they hold this information they prefer to keep secret?

Most media were satisfied with reassuring information on the situation in Europe, which unfortunately in their silence.
All lessons must be learned from these dysfunctions both at European and international level so that opacity and indifference do not preside over the management of the next nuclear disaster.
2
Read the text of the Convention, which entered into force in October 1986; see the list of signatory states as of March 3, 2017

Source for this post in French here;

Click to access 2017-11-17_ru-106_oms+aiea.pdf

November 17, 2017 - Posted by arclight2011part2 | Uncategorized