Expert Warns of ‘Rubber Stamp’ Approvals as Ontario Expands Nuclear Spending
the changes effectively shift final authority from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to cabinet if concerns arise during assessment. It also shifts accountability if those decisions eventually go wrong—although the elected officials involved would likely be out of office by the time the full impacts were known.
the budget “goes on at some length about how wonderful [nuclear projects] are in terms of their economic contributions, but never actually talks about costs.”
the combination of the proposed new builds, the SMR pilots, and refurbishments will push capital expenditures “north of $400 billion”.
June 3, 2026, Nathaniel Crouch, https://www.theenergymix.com/expert-warns-of-rubber-stamp-approvals-as-ontario-expands-nuclear-spending/?utm_source=The+Energy+Mix&utm_campaign=7f479c951f-TEM_RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_dc146fb5ca-7f479c951f-510028305
Federal impact assessment reviews for two Ontario nuclear projects risk serving as little more than procedural approvals, a Toronto environmental studies professor says, as they move through the process without first identifying the reactor types to be built.
Ontario’s Wesleyville Project in Port Hope has several reactor technologies under consideration, and the Bruce C expansion near Kincardine has not yet selected a technology, either. Both are undergoing federal impact assessment.
Mark Winfield, a professor at the Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change at York University, told The Energy Mix he is also concerned that proposed federal approval reforms, combined with Bill C-5 passed last summer, and the newly announced National Electricity Strategy, could lead to what he called “the explicit politicization of decision-making on nuclear projects.” Where “once projects are designated as being in the national interest,” he said, “they will be approved regardless of what the technical reviews find.”
That would be “a very dangerous situation when dealing with what will be first-of-kind reactors in Canada, or in some cases globally,” he added.
Winfield said the changes effectively shift final authority from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to cabinet if concerns arise during assessment. It also shifts accountability if those decisions eventually go wrong—although the elected officials involved would likely be out of office by the time the full impacts were known.
“The implication of going to cabinet is that the regulator’s concerns could be overridden for political or economic reasons,” he said, recalling Harper government’s 2008 decision to fire the CNSC chair after the rejection of the MAPLE reactors at Chalk River.
Winfield said Canada’s new electricity strategy seemed to “aggressively skate over” the cost implications of its nuclear heavy focus, as nuclear energy continues to be subject to enormous capital costs and construction delays.
“Essentially the federal strategy seems to be following Ontario’s lead—a heavy emphasis on gas and nuclear, and mostly ignoring the global movement in the direction of renewables.”
Ontario, Ratepayers Confront Growing Nuclear Costs
Critics have warned that Ontario’s nuclear expansion strategy could carry major long-term financial consequences.
In May, the Ontario government announced a $300-million cost-sharing agreement with Bruce Power to advance early planning for the expansion of the Bruce C nuclear complex, a project the province said would support 18,900 jobs and help make Ontario home to the largest nuclear generating facility in the world.
The announcement marked one of the clearest signals yet that Premier Doug Ford’s government sees large-scale nuclear expansion as the backbone of Ontario’s future electricity system. It also landed amid criticism that the province is shifting billions in electricity costs onto taxpayers, obscuring the long-term price of nuclear refurbishments, new reactors, and small modular nuclear projects.
Ontario’s 2026 budget led the province into a $13.8-billion deficit, with energy expenditures— and nuclear energy in particular—central to the shortfall. The government’s budget documents flagged large “amounts for electricity cost relief” and related line items, but stopped short of detailing long-term capital costs. That omission drew sharp criticism from electricity system experts.
Winfield said the budget “goes on at some length about how wonderful [nuclear projects] are in terms of their economic contributions, but never actually talks about costs.” Using figures the province provided for electricity supports, Winfield calculated that electricity-related spending accounted for roughly half the deficit—about $6.9 billion on the books—but said it would be difficult to figure out exactly how much of that line item in the budget is nuclear related because the figures are “deliberately opaque.”
Environmental Defence Canada Programs Director Keith Brooks too linked the deficit to rising nuclear and legacy refurbishment costs, as well as growing use of gas power plants to meet growing demand while the nuclear plants are being brought online.
29% Rate Hike
Last November, Ontario raised its basic electricity rate by 29% and simultaneously expanded rebate programs, which the government framed as short-term relief and a change in cost allocations. Both Winfield and Brooks said those measures masked the underlying driver: rising costs tied to refurbished and new nuclear plants. “What they seem to be doing is setting a precedent—allowing the costs for these projects to be charged to ratepayers before they’re built,” Winfield said, adding that the combination of the proposed new builds, the SMR pilots, and refurbishments will push capital expenditures “north of $400 billion”.
the combination of the proposed new builds, the SMR pilots, and refurbishments will push capital expenditures “north of $400 billion”.
Nuclear Power Returns to the Forefront of Quebec’s Energy Debate
“It’s an industry that’s generally heavily subsidized by the government, because the private sector is less willing to take on these risks,” adds Jean-Pierre Finet. He points out that the majority of nuclear power plant construction projects, which typically span about a decade, exceed their scheduled timelines and budgets. “Public funds are used to mitigate the risks of these projects,” he notes, adding that customers are then called upon to absorb the excess costs.
Nuclear power continues to polarize the debate. Here’s why.
French-language article, by Juliane C Lelarge, Le Devoir, June 3 2026
As Ottawa accelerates its nuclear development, Quebec evaluates various energy scenarios, and new Liberal leader Charles Milliard says he is open to the sector. Nuclear power is resurfacing in the public debate. Presented by its supporters as a carbon-free solution to meet growing electricity demand, nuclear power continues to polarize the debate. Here’s why.
Why is there a resurgence of interest in nuclear power?
The electrification of society and the gradual phase-out of fossil fuels, particularly in transportation and buildings, are expected to lead to a marked increase in electricity demand over the coming years, explains Karim Zaghib, a professor of chemical engineering at Concordia University and former director of research at Hydro-Québec. He also highlights the rapid growth of artificial intelligence and data centers, which is likely to exacerbate this pressure.
Current geopolitical instability and aspirations for energy independence are also fueling a global resurgence in the nuclear industry. And the development of new technologies, such as small modular reactors, is reinforcing this trend, although some experts are calling for caution.
This interest was particularly evident in the preliminary drafts of the Integrated Energy Resources Management Plan (PGIRE), published in March, which explores a scenario involving a return to nuclear power, even though many industry stakeholders question the influences behind this inclusion.
“We know, for example, that in Quebec, the firm AtkinsRéalis [formerly known as SNC-Lavalun] is lobbying in this direction. There are also American corporations exerting pressure,” explains Jean-Pierre Finet, an analyst with the Regroupement des organismes environnementaux en énergie.
Does nuclear energy have advantages?
Nuclear power is among the energy sources with the lowest CO2 emissions over its entire life cycle, on a par with wind and hydroelectric power. “Compared to wind power, it also has the advantage of being quieter and having no significant impact on the landscape or land use,” explains Karim Zaghib, who notes that Quebec’s geography—and its multitude of waterways—is well-suited to the installation of power plants.
According to Guy Marleau, a professor in the Department of Engineering Physics at Polytechnique Montréal, nuclear infrastructure also has a much longer lifespan: 60 years for a power plant, compared to an average of 12 years for a wind turbine. The electricity production of a nuclear power plant is also incomparable to that of renewable energy sources, he notes.
Karim Zaghib views nuclear power as a complement to wind and solar energy, and stresses the importance of diversifying energy sources to ensure the grid’s resilience. This is because nuclear power provides a more stable baseload energy supply, he explains.
In Jean-Pierre Finet’s view, however, nuclear power’s inflexibility is a disadvantage. “With hydroelectric power, we can adapt to demand. With nuclear, it’s like having the pedal to the metal all the time,” he explains, noting that energy produced during periods of low demand is sold at a low price, or even at a loss. “That’s why we buy a lot of low-cost energy from Ontario, which sometimes has no choice but to offload it.” Advances in energy storage also put the issue of renewable energy’s intermittency into perspective, he says.
“Nuclear power is sometimes seen as an alternative for more climate-skeptical stakeholders who reject renewables on principle,” notes Philippe Gauthier, an energy analyst at the Rivières Foundation, citing the energy strategy implemented by the Trump administration in the United States as an example.
What would reinvesting in the sector in Quebec entail?
“It would be extremely expensive,” Philippe Gauthier states right off the bat, noting that nuclear development is one of the most costly forms of energy production.
“It’s an industry that’s generally heavily subsidized by the government, because the private sector is less willing to take on these risks,” adds Jean-Pierre Finet. He points out that the majority of nuclear power plant construction projects, which typically span about a decade, exceed their scheduled timelines and budgets. “Public funds are used to mitigate the risks of these projects,” he notes, adding that customers are then called upon to absorb the excess costs.
Another challenge: Quebec’s nuclear expertise is disappearing. “To shut down the Gentilly plants, Hydro-Québec had to reach out to its retirees, who were the only ones left with that expertise,” recalls Philippe Gauthier. This lack of expertise makes the industry still very much an American one, asserts Jean-Pierre Finet, who rejects the argument for energy sovereignty. He points out that Canada’s largest federally-owned nuclear facilities, the Chalk River Laboratories, have been managed since 2025 by a private American consortium, some of whose largest companies are linked to the U.S. defense sector.
Is the issue of safety still relevant today?
“Today, safety is a given,” argues Karim Zaghib, noting that accidents are now very rare. The issue that remains a subject of debate is radioactive waste. “With our current drilling capabilities, we’re able to bury it tens of kilometers underground,” says the researcher.
“The waste issue is far from resolved,” counters Jean-Pierre Finet. He cites as an example the discharge of toxic wastewater from the Chalk River facilities into the Ottawa River in 2024. The nuclear project, which in recent weeks received a federal grant of $2.2 billion, calls for the burial of large quantities of radioactive waste near the surface. This part of the project is the subject of litigation, including with the Anishinaabe community of Kebaowek, which won a victory on this matter on May 28 in the Federal Court of Appeal.
More broadly, experts criticize the nuclear industry for a real lack of transparency. “The current oversight process is practically nonexistent,” laments Philippe Gauthier, who believes the ties between the industry and regulatory bodies are too close. He cites as an example the case of the 62.8 tons of irradiated uranium fuel that was transported in secret on Quebec’s roads in the summer of 2025.
Several experts interviewed believe that the global trend toward a return to nuclear energy must also be analyzed in light of the phenomenon of nuclear rearmament. “The military industry needs the civilian industry to develop its expertise,” explains Philippe Gauthier. “We cannot ignore the fact that military applications are still part of the nuclear equation.”
Is the development of nuclear power part of a transition strategy?
“We must not confuse adding carbon-free generation with decarbonization,” explains Jean-Pierre Finet. “All we’ve done so far is add carbon-free generation without reducing the rest of our [fossil fuel] consumption, which doesn’t reduce GHG emissions. It’s mainly a pretext for further industrialization.”
According to him, the issue isn’t about increasing energy production, but about better managing its distribution and consumption, particularly through more efficient use and storage.
More broadly, experts are calling on governments to dare to talk about energy conservation. “It seems like we’re doing all this to avoid having to change our behaviors, and then our lifestyles. The extractivist approach is not sustainable,” argues Mr. Finet.
The atomic clock is ticking.
Western countries build far more slowly, when they build at all. The Darlington SMR is one of only six in the entire Western Hemisphere to begin construction in the past 40 years. Of those, only two, located in the U.S., completed construction, both spectacularly late.
A nuclear project’s schedule and cost are inextricably linked: Any delay will eat into contingencies, and, if sustained, will blow budgets to smithereens. Moreover, delays compound the already daunting challenge of financing the project.
even within the nuclear industry, many doubt SMRs can offer sufficient advantages to attract orders; the results of the first SMR in a G7 country could settle the matter.
Will Canada’s first new nuclear reactor in decades be built on time? Here’s how an Ontario utility’s promises stack up against the numbers
Matthew McClearn, The Globe and Mail, June 4, 2026, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-nuclear-reactor-ontario-power-generation-utility/
The race to build Canada’s first new nuclear reactor in more than three decades has officially begun on the north shore of Lake Ontario.
In late April, the Ontario government announced that the foundation of the building that will house the reactor had been lifted to its final resting place, down a 35-metre-deep vertical shaft, by one of the world’s largest crawler cranes. The foundation weighed more than 950 tonnes – heavier than three Airbus A380s, the government said.
With that, a clock started ticking.
As far as Ontario Power Generation is concerned, the Darlington small modular reactor, or SMR, has been under construction for about a year now. But according to nuclear industry bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and Mycle Schneider Consulting, which compile data on nuclear projects globally, construction officially begins with the placing of concrete for the foundation of the reactor building.
OPG and its partners – including reactor developer GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy, construction company Aecon Group Inc., and architect-engineer AtkinsRéalis Group Inc. – have just four years and seven months to complete construction and connect the reactor to the grid, as promised, by the end of 2030. Once built, the reactor could supply enough electricity to power 300,000 homes. It’s a crucial first step for Ontario’s energy plans, which envision building many more reactors in the coming years.
Nuclear plants join high-speed rail, large bridges and tunnels, hydroelectric dams (think Site C) and major IT initiatives (think the federal Phoenix payroll system) on the list of complex engineering works that are highly likely to suffer lengthy delays. They’re akin to the Olympics for project managers; by promising the SMR in less than five years, OPG has effectively promised a gold medal.
Don’t let the “small” moniker fool you: The Darlington SMR is no minor undertaking. Lately, as many as 1,500 workers have been on-site on a typical work day.
OPG’s lengthy task list includes building the first-ever BWRX-300 reactor, a robust containment building to house it, a control building which will include the main control room, and another structure to house the turbine generator. It must also complete support structures for the other three planned units. They include a water cooling system complete with underground tunnels, and a switchyard.
According to an analysis of data from Mycle Schneider Consulting by The Globe and Mail, few reactors have been built in less than five years in recent history.
The fortunes of corporate executives, politicians, suppliers and even the nuclear industry itself depend on whether OPG’s team can demonstrate they are as exceptional as their political masters claim.
Why would completing a reactor in five years be difficult?
Canada’s nuclear industry finished building its last nuclear power reactor more than three decades ago. The 25 Candu reactors that started construction between 1958 and 1985 took an average of slightly longer than seven years to bring into commercial operations. Many of those reactors have been refurbished, which has reinvigorated Ontario’s nuclear industry. Even so, many of the skills required to build a plant from scratch have atrophied.
The closest Canadian analogue to the Darlington SMR might be Douglas Point, the earliest attempt to construct a commercial nuclear power plant. When work began in 1960 in Tiverton, Ont., Canada had limited experience building nuclear plants. Just like Douglas Point, the Darlington SMR is essentially a prototype. Douglas Point’s 200-megawatt output placed it in the same class. It took 8½ years to build.
Canada’s fastest build was Pickering-3, running from late 1967 to early 1972. Those years spanned a period when Ontario hit its stride building multiple reactors, but shows tight timelines were achievable back then.
How long has it taken to build nuclear plants globally?
China dominates modern reactor construction: According to Mycle Schneider Consulting data, 44 of the 75 reactors that began construction worldwide since 2016 are there. Yet few Chinese reactors are delivered within five years.
Western countries build far more slowly, when they build at all. The Darlington SMR is one of only six in the entire Western Hemisphere to begin construction in the past 40 years. Of those, only two, located in the U.S., completed construction, both spectacularly late.
Boasting about modular construction techniques, American reactor developer Westinghouse promised it could build its AP1000 reactor in just 36 months. Four AP1000s eventually started construction in the U.S. in 2013. Two of them, Vogtle Units 3 and 4, took more than a decade each. The other two, V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3, in South Carolina, were abandoned after roughly four years; efforts to restart their construction are now under way.
The only reactor attempted in France so far this century, Flamanville-3, was planned to take a little more than four years. It took 17. The only two reactors started in the United Kingdom since 2016 were at the Hinkley Point station, Britain’s largest nuclear power site; they’re approaching 12 years and counting, still under construction.
Why are nuclear builds so frequently delayed?
Nuclear projects face delays for numerous reasons. But some cardinal sins occur regularly, such as proceeding without a complete set of detailed blueprints.
The two V.C. Summer units in South Carolina, for example, began construction when engineering designs were incomplete. Drawings often turned out to be not constructible, sending designs back to the drawing board. Those changes, in turn, led to more work for subcontractors, which provoked disputes over who’d pay the resulting costs. Any changes also had to be approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
A report by Jean-Martin Folz, former head of French automaker Peugeot, found that construction at France’s Flamanville-3 also began without a complete set of validated plans. The result was that the plant’s design continuously changed during construction, and lots of work had to be redone.
Quality control is another common stumbling block. At Flamanville-3, Mr. Folz catalogued a wide range of defects including poor welds and badly-manufactured forged components. Defects can lead to a cycle of delays, rework and disputes.
Once delays start piling up, it’s hard to recover. At Flamanville, Mr. Folz noted that Électricité de France tried to accelerate work schedules to get back on track. That only led to other problems, leading to further rework and delays, not to mention overloaded and demoralized crews.
After years of poor performance, the construction of the Vogtle units in Georgia was placed under new management. Don Grace was an engineer hired by the Georgia Public Service Commission to evaluate the project’s progress. During testimony in 2022, he explained that the new proponents “prematurely” started testing equipment at the plant, even as construction continued.
The problem? Mr. Grace said it resulted in too many workers toiling alongside one another on compressed timetables – a problem dubbed “stacking of crafts.” That was exacerbated by management’s tendency to defer planned work to achieve near-term milestones that provided “an inaccurate impression of having made significant progress.”
Mr. Grace put it this way: “The scope of work for a new nuclear plant is so large, and how the proper scoping and sequencing of all the activities comes together is highly important.”
What’s behind OPG’s confidence?
OPG believes the BWRX-300, while being first of its kind, is the simplest-ever boiling water reactor, a mature American-designed technology. There are more than 100 of them operating worldwide, so many of its basic principles have been demonstrated before.
OPG also counts on modular construction techniques to speed things up. The Darlington SMR’s base mat is a good example: It is comprised of 56 sections that were manufactured off-site. Upon delivery to Darlington, they were welded together in a special building with a retractable roof, then lifted into place by crane. In theory, this should be more efficient than assembling a warren of rebar, erecting forms and then pouring huge volumes of concrete.
“Many components will be pre-assembled offsite into larger modules and lifted into place – such as skid-mounted systems and pre-assembled piping – reducing onsite duration and risk,” wrote OPG spokesperson Neal Kelly in a written response to questions.
OPG is also taking an off-the-shelf approach wherever possible. For example, the plant’s turbine and generator are to be the same standard units already proven in natural gas plants.
And OPG is using what it calls an “integrated project delivery contract model,” which it says will encourage partners to collaborate, share risks and rewards, and maximize efficiency. Previous nuclear projects have demonstrated that how contracts are written, and how the various stakeholders work together, matters a great deal – especially when unforeseen challenges arise.
Of note, Mr. Kelly wrote that the plant’s design was completed in December.
What’s at stake?
Most immediately, the fate of the Darlington SMR. A nuclear project’s schedule and cost are inextricably linked: Any delay will eat into contingencies, and, if sustained, will blow budgets to smithereens. Moreover, delays compound the already daunting challenge of financing the project: Owners must wait that much longer to start earning revenue by generating electricity.
A nuclear project’s schedule and cost are inextricably linked: Any delay will eat into contingencies, and, if sustained, will blow budgets to smithereens. Moreover, delays compound the already daunting challenge of financing the project: Owners must wait that much longer to start earning revenue by generating electricity.
Though contracts haven’t been signed yet, Ontario has already committed to build three more BWRX-300s. Its existing nuclear plants all have four identical reactors, an approach that has demonstrated significant benefits. An $8-billion one-off lemon would be a costly miss.
The Darlington SMR is the signature project of Nicole Butcher, who assumed OPG’s top job in early 2025. Ontario Energy Minister Stephen Lecce, who approved it, has bet heavily on OPG’s prowess, insisting the utility stands alone in building on-time and on-budget.
Mr. Lecce’s entire vision for Ontario’s electricity hinges on that statement being true. His plan involves a major expansion of nuclear power, in which the SMR would be followed by two much larger projects, the combined cost of which would likely be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Failure to deliver the comparatively modest Darlington SMR might compel a rethink.
Similarly, the federal government has invested considerable political and financial capital in SMRs. Yet of all the research clusters and demonstration units promised over the past decade, the Darlington SMR is just about the only one still standing. Ottawa has provided billions of dollars in financing, thus becoming a substantial minority owner in the project, and referred it to Prime Minister Mark Carney’s new Major Projects Office.
Other utilities around the world have expressed interest in building their own BWRX-300s. More than 100 Canadian companies have signed agreements to provide components and services for the Darlington SMR; successful delivery could lead to contracts if global utilities feel bold enough to build their own.
SMRs represent a promising but untested approach to manufacturing reactors – one that emphasizes simplification and mass production. Whereas large reactors are purchased almost exclusively by resource-rich utilities, SMRs are marketed as being cheaper and quicker to build – and thus suitable for a broader range of customers. Yet even within the nuclear industry, many doubt SMRs can offer sufficient advantages to attract orders; the results of the first SMR in a G7 country could settle the matter.
And that’s why the Darlington SMR is one of the most important nuclear projects worldwide.
No pressure.
Canadian nuclear company Bruce Power has launched a CAD1 million (USD722,000)bribery system to win over municipalities.
World Nuclear News, 2 June 2026
Bruce Power has launched a CAD1 million (USD722,000) Regional Municipal Readiness Assessment Fund to support municipalities in the Bruce, Grey, and Huron counties in advancing planning related to the proposed Bruce C Project. The fund is designed to support studies and assessments that help municipalities prepare for the potential opportunities and impacts associated with Bruce C – a proposed new power plant of up to 4.8 GW at the Bruce Power site in Ontario – with individual projects to be completed by the end of 2027.
“Municipal leadership is critical in planning for large-scale infrastructure opportunities,” Pat Dalzell, Bruce Power’s Vice-President, Corporate Affairs and Market Development, said. “This new fund will help to ensure communities are well positioned to capture economic benefits while maintaining the services and quality of life residents depend on.”
| brennainlloyd . 3June 26 |
Bruce Power has launched a CAD1 million (USD722,000) Regional Municipal Readiness Assessment Fund to support municipalities in the Bruce, Grey, and Huron counties in advancing planning related to the proposed Bruce C Project. The fund is designed to support studies and assessments that help municipalities prepare for the potential opportunities and impacts associated with Bruce C – a proposed new power plant of up to 4.8 GW at the Bruce Power site in Ontario – with individual projects to be completed by the end of 2027.
“Municipal leadership is critical in planning for large-scale infrastructure opportunities,” Pat Dalzell, Bruce Power’s Vice-President, Corporate Affairs and Market Development, said. “This new fund will help to ensure communities are well positioned to capture economic benefits while maintaining the services and quality of life residents depend on.”
Species at risk score a reprieve
by beyondnuclearinternational, https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2026/05/31/species-at-risk-score-a-reprieve/
Canadian court sends radioactive waste dump plan back to the drawing board in a win for wildlife and the Kebaowek First Nation and others who protect them
News from Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Sierra Club Canada Kebaowek First Nation, Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Sierra Club Canada Foundation.
Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Sierra Club Canada, Kebaowek First Nation, Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Sierra Club Canada Foundation welcome a significant victory following the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal to dismiss Canadian Nuclear Laboratories’ (CNL) appeal regarding the Species at Risk Act permit issued for the proposed Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) at Chalk River.
The Court upheld the Federal Court’s earlier ruling and ordered Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) to reconsider its decision to grant the permit.
The permit would have authorized CNL to destroy endangered species and their habitats in order to construct a massive radioactive waste disposal facility less than 1.1 kilometres from the Ottawa River (Kichi Sibi), a watershed that provides drinking water to millions of Canadians.
In its decision, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that ECCC failed to adequately explain how it determined that all reasonable alternatives had been considered and that the best solution had been selected, as required under the Species at Risk Act.
The Court emphasized that the Minister’s reasons lacked sufficient transparency, intelligibility, and justification, and directed ECCC to conduct a new determination.
The Court also confirmed that the Federal Court’s interpretation of section 73 of the Species at Risk Act is not binding on ECCC and that the Minister must independently provide a clear and reasonable analysis when reconsidering the permit application.
Furthermore, the Court found that the public notice issued by ECCC failed to provide a meaningful explanation to Canadians about why endangered species would be harmed in support of the project.
The ruling represents another important legal milestone in the ongoing efforts to protect species at risk, uphold environmental laws, and ensure accountability in decision-making surrounding the proposed NSDF.
“The Federal Court of Appeal has confirmed that Environment Canada must go back and do its job properly. This decision reinforces what we have been saying from the beginning: decisions that threaten endangered species, sensitive ecosystems, and our sacred river must be based on a transparent, rigorous, and lawful process,” said Chief Lance Haymond of Kebaowek First Nation. “Kebaowek remains committed to protecting the Kichi Sibi, defending our responsibilities to future generations, the drinking water of millions of citizens of Quebec and Ontario, and ensuring that Indigenous rights and environmental protections are respected every step of the way.”
The area selected by CNL for the NSDF is home to numerous species protected under the Species at Risk Act, including the Blanding’s Turtle, Little Brown Bat, Northern Myotis, Tri-coloured Bat, Canada Warbler, Golden-winged Warbler, Whip-poor-will, Eastern Wolf, and Black Ash.
The proposed site consists of mature forests, wetlands, streams, and critical habitat that have remained largely undisturbed for decades. The organizations argue that CNL’s site selection process failed to adequately assess alternative locations that may have posed fewer risks to endangered species and their habitats. The Court’s decision now provides an opportunity for ECCC to conduct a more rigorous and transparent review of the evidence before making a new determination.
“This decision is an important victory for science, transparency, and common sense,” said Ole Hendrickson, spokesperson for Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area. “The Court recognized that the public deserves meaningful explanations when decisions are made that could result in the destruction of endangered species and their habitats. The ecological value of this site is extraordinary, and it deserves careful consideration before irreversible damage is permitted.”
“This ruling confirms that environmental protections under the Species at Risk Act cannot simply be treated as a procedural box to check,” said Dr. Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility.
“We will continue working to ensure that all reasonable alternatives are fully examined and that the protection of species at risk remains a central consideration. More generally, we will work to ensure that the principle of “justification” is enshrined in Canadian law, as recommended twice by the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Edwards added.
“The Court’s decision reinforces a fundamental principle: Canadians have the right to understand why environmental harm is being authorized and whether less damaging alternatives exist,” said Gretchen Fitzgerald, Executive Director, Sierra Club Canada Foundation. “This case is about accountability, transparency, and ensuring that environmental laws are applied as Parliament intended. Sierra Club Canada Foundation remains committed to supporting efforts that protect biodiversity and uphold the public interest.”
This decision builds upon two important Federal Court rulings related to the proposed NSDF project. In March 2025, the Federal Court ruled that the Species at Risk Act permit issued for the project must be reconsidered because reasonable alternative locations were not properly assessed.
In a parallel case, the Federal Court also ruled in favour of Kebaowek First Nation regarding the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the duty to consult in the NSDF licensing process. That landmark decision is currently before the Federal Court of Appeal and is expected to help clarify how Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and UNDRIP should be applied in federal regulatory decision-making across Canada.
While the Court has returned the matter to ECCC for redetermination rather than permanently rejecting the permit, the organizations intend to actively participate in the reconsideration process. They will continue to present evidence demonstrating that alternative locations exist and that the proposed Chalk River site is not the best option for protecting species at risk and their habitats.
The organizations also note that CNL may seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, although leave applications are granted only in a small number of cases involving issues of national importance.
Kebaowek First Nation, Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Sierra Club Canada Foundation remain united in their commitment to protecting the Ottawa River watershed, safeguarding endangered species, and ensuring that environmental decision- making respects both ecological integrity and Indigenous rights.
For more information on Kebaowek First Nation’s efforts to halt the NSDF project, visit Stop Nuclear Waste website. For more information on how to support Kebaowek First Nation’s legal efforts, visit Kebaowek First Nation – Raven Trust.
Canada’s nuclear ambitions need fuel security, not just new reactors.
Canada is expanding nuclear power but remains dependent on foreign enriched uranium for the next generation of reactors.
Policy Options, May 28, 2026, Alex MacDonald
“……………………………………………………. In Canada, refurbishments of existing large-scale reactors are being completed. The first small modular reactor (SMR) in the G7 is scheduled to come online in 2030 in Ontario with three more planned. Alberta and Saskatchewan are considering adding nuclear power to their energy mix while advanced nuclear reactors are even being pitched to alleviate the persistent energy struggles in Northern Canada………………………………
The Canadian Nuclear Association predicts that Canada will adopt billions of dollars worth of new and advanced nuclear technologies – large light-water reactors, SMRs and micro modular reactors – all of which will be deployed in Canada for the first time.
These technologies have one thing in common. They require enriched uranium to operate. Their supply chains and operational needs are different and more risk-exposed than what Canada has historically operated in the nuclear field………………………….
It makes little sense for governments and ratepayers to underwrite the necessary large capital expenditures of these new reactors without maximizing certainty on operational costs and supply. It is like commissioning the building of a skyscraper without knowing the cost of the steel to build it………………………………………………………………………….. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/2026/05/canada-nuclear-fuel-security-uranium-enrichment/
Federal appeal court upholds First Nations victory to protect wildlife at planned nuclear waste site
The Globe and Mail, May 29, 2026, Marie Woolf, Ottawa, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-federal-appeal-court-upholds-first-nations-protect-wildlife/
A small Quebec First Nation has won a landmark case in the Federal Court of Appeal over a failure to reduce risks to wildlife – including two types of bat and a yellow throated turtle – in planning the location of a nuclear waste storage site near the Ottawa River.
The Federal Court of Appeal on Thursday upheld a decision last year by the Federal Court that ruled in favour of Kebaowek First Nation and local environment advocates.
The ruling may stall plans to build a storage mound at the Chalk River Laboratories site northwest of Ottawa, designed to hold up to one million cubic metres of radioactive low-level nuclear waste. It could also have implications for future legal challenges to building projects, which could threaten local wildlife.
Kebaowek First Nation and local environmentalists in March last year successfully challenged a 2024 decision by then-environment-minister Steven Guilbeault to issue a permit allowing a nuclear waste mound near the Ottawa river to be built, even though it could impact species at risk
The former environment minister issued the species-at-risk permit, allowing Canadian Nuclear Laboratories to press ahead with its plans for the waste site, in spite of potential harm to two types of bats and a turtle with a bright yellow throat.
The permit authorized incidental harm, harassment or killing of the threatened Blanding’s turtle, the endangered little brown bat and endangered Northern long-eared bat.
The Blanding’s turtle, which can live for 80 years in the wild, is known as the turtle “with a sun under its chin” in some Indigenous legends. Its population has been hit by habitat loss, invasive species and development.
The construction of the nuclear waste mound at Chalk River could lead to such turtles being killed on roads, while the habitat where the bats roost and raise their young could also be threatened, Kebaowek First Nation has warned. It fears the development would also harm black bears with dens there, and other wildlife including rare Eastern wolves.
Ole Hendrickson, conservation committee chair with the non-profit Sierra Club Canada Foundation, an environmental group that mounted the challenge alongside the First Nation, said the ruling “will have implications right across Canada, for other threatened habitat.”
“This should send a strong message to the federal government that placing environmental protection in last place after economic interest is not only unacceptable to Canadians, it will cause them trouble in the courts,” he said in a statement.
The Federal Court of Appeal decision comes amid tension over environmental protection, Indigenous rights and major federally backed projects.
On Wednesday, Mr. Guilbeault, a committed environmentalist, announced his resignation from federal politics. Mr. Guilbeault played a key role in many of the previous Liberal government’s climate initiatives which have been diluted, stalled or reversed by the current government. He plans to resign his seat later this summer.
In the judgment issued on Thursday the Federal Court of Appeal questioned Mr. Guilbeault’s decision that Chalk River was the “best solution” for the storage site. To issue a species of risk permit, the minister needed to be of the view that “all reasonable alternatives” had been considered as locations.
Three judges at the Federal Court of Appeal ruled on Thursday that Mr. Guilbeault’s decision to issue a permit was “unreasonable” and in dismissing the appeal by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories said the issue should go back to the current minister for redetermination.
Minister of Environment and Climate Change Julie Dabrusin will now have to reconsider the issuing of a species-at-risk permit, and whether there could be other viable locations for the site with fewer impacts on wildlife. CNL, which plans to build and operate the proposed waste dump, had looked at other locations owned by the Crown corporation Atomic Energy of Canada, but chose Chalk River.
Chief Lance Haymond of Kebaowek First Nation said “the Federal Court of Appeal has confirmed that Environment Canada must go back and do its job properly.”
Nicholas Pope, the Ottawa lawyer who represented Kebaowek First Nation, said there are alternative sites that could have been considered, including federal land near Chalk River that would have not posed as great a threat to species at risk.
He hoped Ms. Dabrusin in looking again at species at risk would also consider the potential impact on endangered monarch butterflies, and Eastern wolves that roam at the Chalk River site.
In 2024, the federal environment department upgraded the Eastern wolf, found only in Ontario and Quebec, to threatened species status, saying there may be as few as 236 adults in Canada.
Cecelia Parsons, spokesperson for Environment and Climate Change Canada, said it is reviewing the court of appeal decision “and its implications carefully and will determine next steps as appropriate.”
CNL said it had sought “to obtain clarity in a complex regulatory environment” in going to the Federal Court of Appeal.
“CNL respects the decision of the court and is now taking time to evaluate today’s decision and determine next steps,” it said in a statement. “CNL remains committed to protecting the environment and species at-risk – restoration and protection of the environment is at the core of our work.”
Last year, the federal court partly granted Kebaowek’s application for judicial review of the decision to build the Chalk River waste dump on the grounds that it was not properly consulted. This decision is now before the Federal Court of Appeal.
Legal Victory for Kebaowek First Nation and Allies vs. Proposed Radioactive Megadump
Federal Court of Appeal Upholds Victory for Kebaowek First Nation and Allies in ”Species at Risk” Case Against Chalk River Nuclear Waste Project
Kebaowek, May 29, 2026 – Kebaowek First Nation, Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, theCanadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Sierra Club Canada Foundation welcome a significantvictory following the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal to dismiss Canadian Nuclear Laboratories’(CNL) appeal regarding the Species at Risk Act permit issued for the proposed Near Surface DisposalFacility (NSDF) at Chalk River. The Court upheld the Federal Court’s earlier ruling and ordered Environmentand Climate Change Canada (ECCC) to reconsider its decision to grant the permit.
The permit would have authorized CNL to destroy endangered species and their habitats in order to construct a massive radioactive waste disposal facility less than 1.1 kilometres from the Ottawa River (Kichi Sibi), a watershed that provides drinking water to millions of Canadians.
In its decision, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that ECCC failed to adequately explain how it determined that all reasonable alternatives had been considered and that the best solution had been selected, as required under the Species at Risk Act. The Court emphasized that the Minister’s reasons lacked sufficient transparency, intelligibility, and justification, and directed ECCC to conduct a new determination. The Court also confirmed that the Federal Court’s interpretation of section 73 of the Species at Risk Act is not binding on ECCC and that the Minister must independently provide a clear and reasonable analysis when reconsidering the permit application.
Furthermore, the Court found that the public notice issued by ECCC failed to provide a meaningful explanation to Canadians about why endangered species would be unharmed in support of the project.
Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (CCNR)Re: Comments on the Integrated Tailored Impact StatementGuidelines for the Deep Geological Repository (DGR)For Canada’s Used Nuclear Fuel Project
There is going to be a public impact assessment process. Now is the time to debate the alternatives for the first time in public.
TO – Impact Assessment Agency of Canada (IAAC), May 10 2026, https://www.ccnr.org/IAAC_NWMO_Guidelines_CCNR_2026.pdf
The Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (CCNR) has reviewed the Draft
Integrated Tailored Impact Statement Guidelines for the Deep Geological Repository
(DGR) For Canada’s Used Nuclear Fuel, a Project of the Nuclear Waste Management
Organization (NWMO), and offers the following comments on those Draft Guidelines.
Stated Purpose of the Project
The stated purpose of the project is highly suspect because it is couched in selfcontradictory language. In its Initial Description of the project (p.v) the proponent states:
“Canada’s nuclear power plants have provided, and are expected to continue
providing, clean, reliable, and low-carbon energy for decades. However,
used nuclear fuel remains radioactive for a very long time and therefore
requires careful, permanent management to avoid placing a burden on future
generations.” Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO)
Initial Project Description
Deep Geological Repository (DGR) for Canada’s Used Nuclear Fuel Project
December 2025
It is ironic that nuclear power is described, in two consecutive sentences, as a “clean”
energy source, but one whose waste byproducts nevertheless remain dangerously
radioactive for such “a very long time”, that extraordinary measures are required to
“avoid placing a burden on future generations.”
It is a stunning example of cognitive dissonance; that is, “the mental discomfort or
psychological stress experienced when a person holds two or more contradictory
beliefs, values, or attitudes, or acts in a way that goes against them.” On the one hand, the proponent asserts that nuclear power is essentially a problem-free technology, and
on the other hand is ready to expend upwards of $26 billion dollars and 160 years of
effort to “solve” what is a glaringly obvious problem – long-lived highly toxic garbage.
The contradiction in terminology is not just psychologically uncomfortable, but also selfdefeating – for NWMO goes on to enunciate (p.v-vi) its goal, accompanied by a
declaration of the industry’s intentions that belie that goal altogether.
“If implemented, the project would:
- provide a permanent and safe disposal solution for used nuclear fuel;
- support Canada’s commitments to climate action and achieving net-zero by
2050 by ensuring nuclear energy remains a sustainable and socially
responsible energy source; - eliminate the need for future generations to actively manage used nuclear
fuel, thereby reducing long-term environmental risks and advancing
equity in managing Canada’s nuclear legacy.”
A careful reading shows that the “safe disposal solution” for used nuclear fuel is not
really intended to unburden future generations altogether by “eliminating the need to
actively manage used nuclear fuel”, but rather to perpetuate the hazards of keeping
used nuclear fuel at the surface by “ensuring nuclear energy remains … sustainable” as
an energy source. Thus the DGR is not designed to “get rid” of used fuel once and for
all, but rather to clear the decks of older waste and make room for newer waste. The
industry has no intentions of ever stopping the production of that toxic waste material.
This is no small matter. Already the Agency is dealing with three major proposals for
new nuclear plants: the 4800 megawatt Peace River Nuclear Project, the 4800
megawatt Bruce C project, and the 10,000 megawatt Wesleyville project, with more
projects to come…. Already there are over 20,000 megawatts of new nuclear electricity
production planned (including the Darlington New Build). If these new plants are all built,
the annual production of used nuclear fuel in Canada will triple. And that is not the end
of the story. Further nuclear expansion in other provinces and territories is also planned.
To maintain credibility, the Agency cannot turn a blind eye to these contradictions. The
NWMO project currently under review by the Agency is only designated to deal with the waste produced by Canada’s existing operational fleet of 17 CANDU reactors (plus the
waste produced by seven shut-down power reactors and a handful of research reactors
owned by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited). That is less than one-third of the volume
of high-level radioactive waste now foreseen. It is patently false that the currently
proposed DGR project will “eliminate the need for future generations to actively manage
used nuclear fuel.” The stated goal of the project is, in that sense, fraudulent
In fact, no one intends to move used nuclear fuel into a DGR until it has been out of the
reactor for at least 30 years. Consequently, there will always be thirty years worth of
unburied waste at the surface (either in wet storage or dry storage) for each and every
operating nuclear reactor, no matter how fast the older used fuel may be buried. Based
on existing plans in Canada, the quantity of unburied used nuclear fuel under thirty
years of age will be tripled – or more than tripled – and will keep growing thereafter.
This is hardly “eliminating” the need for future generations to manage used nuclear fuel.
As long as new nuclear reactors are being built and old ones are continuing to operate,
there is no possibility of achieving the visionary dream of all used fuel safely locked
away in underground chambers. Such a dream is a complete fantasy. It would only be
possible if nuclear power were phased out completely.
Instead, a picture emerges of an increasing number of reactors in operation, each with
its core full of intensely radioactive used fuel, and each surrounded by at least thirty
years worth of additional unburied used fuel in wet and dry storage. Even if all the older
fuel (more than 30 years old) were instantly transported over thousands of kilometres to
the site of the DGR, the remaining catastrophe potential at each reactor site would be
only marginally diminished.
Meanwhile additional risks of fuel damage and radioactive releases would arise in
countless locations across the country due to the vicissitudes of travel along some of
the most hazardous routes in Canada. Thousands of citizens – perhaps millions –would
encounter truckloads of high-level radioactive waste passing through their communities, along their highways, over their bridges, for many decades to come. Severe transport
accidents, even if very infrequent, could result in radioactive contamination of people
and the environment in locations far removed from the generating stations. The
combined efforts of moving spent fuel to a repository location while expanding the
production of nuclear electricity at many new sites may very well make the country less
safe than it would have been if traffic of spent fuel were precluded.
In its report on nuclear energy in Ontario entitled “A Race Against Time”, the Ontario
Royal Commission on Electric Power Panning concluded as follows:
“The hazards associated with transportation, in particular the possibility of
accidents and the threat of hijacking, are real possibilities. Hence, the
minimization of handling and transporting spent fuel is a desirable
objective. (p. 91)
We prefer on-site (i.e. generating station site) spent fuel storage to a
centralized facility. We believe that a central facility would presuppose
the reprocessing of spent fuel; it would also involve more transportation
and social and environmental problems. (p. 95)
Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning
A Race Against Time, 1978
CCNR believes that the Guidelines should include an entire section on transportation –
including (a) routine gamma and neutron exposures (i.e. to those in vehicles following a
transport, to those passing the transport in the opposite direction, to those being
repeatedly exposed along the route, to those irradiated during stops), (b) container
designs and testing of same, (c) severe accident scenarios (fires of greater intensity and
duration than those tested for, drops of greater distances and impacts, sidewise
collisions that might bypass impact limiters, et cetera), and (d) emergency measures
planning and the role of first responders.
Alternatives to the Project
The Impact Assessment Act clearly states that the Agency “must” consider “alternatives to the project,” as well as alternative means of carrying out the project. However on page 9 of the Draft Guidelines, we read
“In the Initial Project Description, the proponent described the ‘alternatives to’
the project that are technically and economically feasible to meet the need for
the project and achieve its purpose. This analysis was carried out through
their Choosing a Way Forward study process pursuant to the Nuclear Fuel
Waste Act. IAAC and the CNSC determined that this information is sufficient
and no additional information is required in the Impact Statement related to
‘alternatives to’.”
CCNR strongly disagrees with this determination. A great many Canadians are unaware
of the fact that there is an alternative to the proposed DGR project that is economically
and technically feasible, and that does not involve moving used nuclear fuel off-site. It is
simply called: continued storage at reactor sites. The nuclear industry agrees that this
method is safe and can be continued for centuries without undue difficulty, provided that
the wastes are repackaged when necessary.
When NWMO published “Choosing A Way Forward”, four options were laid out. The
Government of Canada decided to choose the fourth option – the DGR option,
rebranded as “Adaptive Phased Management”. But there was no public process by
which the pros and cons of the “reactor-site storage” alternative could be discussed.
The Government of Canada did not take the opportunity to solicit other perspectives. At
that time CCNR published a critical commentary on “Choosing a Way Forward”, entitled
“Following the Path Backward” ( http://www.ccnr.org/follow_path_back.pdf ). However there
was no public forum or avenue by which any non-industry point of view could be heard.
There was simply no mechanism for dissenting voices to be weighed in the balance.
There is going to be a public impact assessment process. Now is the time to debate the
alternatives for the first time in public. CCNR believes that the Agency has a duty not to
simply accept the proponent’s point of view on the alternatives, even though the
Government has indicated its preference for the DGR approach. According to the IAA
law, any alternative to the project that is technically and economically feasible “must” be
properly addressed during the Impact Assessment process. Politics does not enter into
it. Accordingly, CCNR believes there must be a section in the Guidelines specifically
addressing the “reactor-site storage” alternative to the proposed DGR,
Some may argue that reactor-site storage is not an acceptable practice for a century or
more, because of the possibility of violent external events (airplane crashes, military
attacks), extreme weather events (tsunamis, earthquakes), or societal disintegration
(anarchy, revolution). But if those are legitimate concerns, why are we planning to build
more nuclear reactors? With new reactors operating, there is bound to be on-site
storage of at least thirty years worth of used nuclear fuel, none of which can be put
underground quickly. Continued onsite storage is definitely an alternative.
Some may argue – and indeed NWMO does argue – that we have to think of future
generations, not just for a few centuries, but for many thousands of years into the future.
But in that case there is no urgent need for the DGR right now. As long as we are intent
on expanding the production of nuclear waste, would it not make more sense to wait
until we decide to wind down the nuclear enterprise altogether at some future date?
That way we can deal with all the waste at once instead of maintaining regiments of
high-level waste here, there, and everywhere, with more on the highways every day.
At any rate, if concern for far-future civilizations is NWMO’s concern, why is there no
discussion of far-future civilizations in NWMO’s Project Description? Indeed, how are
we to communicate with far-future civilizations, when we don’t even know what
languages they will be speaking? If we choose to tell them nothing, what will prevent
them from digging up the buried waste, perhaps without them realizing what it is? Will
they imagine it is buried treasure? It will surely be clear that somebody did a gigantic
excavation in the remote past. What could it be? On the other hand, if we leave a
marker saying “Danger, Do Not Dig Here”, I can imagine some future archaeologist
rubbing his hands with glee and saying, “Folks, this looks interesting; let’s dig here!”.
CCNR recommends that there should be a section in the Guidelines dealing with the
question of communicating with future generations, along with what information we
should be communicating. Do we not have an obligation to impart to future generations
the important facts about the radioactive legacy we are leaving them?
“…The Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) of the OECD
NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency) launched an initiative ion the “Preservation of
Records, Knowledge and Memory”, hereafter “RK&M Initiative” that ran from
March 2011 to April 2018. Twenty-one organisations from 14 countries,
representing implementing agencies, regulators, policy makers, R&D
institutions, and international ad archiving agencies, plus the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency), contributed to the work.”
Stephan Hotzel, GRS and Chair of the RK&M Initiative
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)
Of course this is assuming that the DGR does not turn out to be a colossal mistake, like
the Asse-2 salt mine in Germany. It was used as a deep underground nuclear waste
repository for low and intermediate-level waste for decades until persistent leakage of
radioactive poisons into groundwater led the German government to order the spending
of over $5 billion (equivalent) to remove the radioactive waste from the repository – a
task that will take at least 30 years, a task that is ongoing today.
Alternative Means
The Impact Assessment Act requires the Agency to consider alternative means of
carrying out a proposed project. It seems clear that the greatest danger of experiencing
radioactive releases from used nuclear fuel comes about through the handling or
manipulation of individual fuel bundles that are damaged in some way – small cracks or
pin holes, for example. In general, the less handling of the fuel, the better.
According to NWMO’s current plans for the DGR, spent fuel will be transported to the
site of the DGR where they will then be repackaged prior to emplacement in the
repository. Repackaging entails removing the fuel bundles from the transport containers
and repackaging them in a copper-coated steel burial container.
CCNR recommends that if the DGR Project is given the go-ahead, this final
repackaging step be eliminated, thereby putting less strain on the host community. This
can be accomplished by repackaging the used fuel into burial containers before
shipping them to the DGR site. In this way the “willing host community” and the
neighbouring environment will be better protected from inadvertent radioactive releases
caused by handling damaged fuel bundles. The pre-packaged burial containers can be
lowered into the DGR without ever having to open them up, greatly reducing the
chances of fugitive emissions.
A small northern Ontario town refused radioactive waste. It’s gone to Sarnia instead
Decades-old mine tailings in Nipissing First Nation sparked outrage after the province tried to move the material to another community without consultation, but it has quietly moved them again
the Narwhal By Leah Borts-Kuperman (Local Journalism Initiative Reporter), May 6, 2026
Summary
- The Ontario government intended to move radioactive waste from the shore of Lake Nipissing to a former mine site outside Sudbury, Ont.
- A lack of consultation around the new location led to strong local opposition, and delayed the remediation project conducted by Nipissing First Nation.
- The waste has now been moved to a disposal site outside Sarnia, Ont., and Aamjiwnaang First Nation, where emissions from the industrial area known as Chemical Valley have affected local air quality.
For decades, radioactive waste sat near the shore of Lake Nipissing. It looked like an innocuous pile of gravel in what was otherwise a stretch of forest. People began using it to backfill lots, fill spaces under decks and build fire pits. In the 1970s and ’80s, Nipissing First Nation began using it to build roads.
It wasn’t normal gravel, though. It was mine tailings, containing the metal niobium, left there when the Nova Beaucage mine shuttered in 1956 after just seven months of operation.
“The company just walked away and left it with no remediation at all,” Geneviève Couchie, business operations manager at Nipissing First Nation, said. Couchie led a project to clean up the tailings, which first started in 2019. After being interrupted by COVID-19 shutdowns, the remediation resumed in spring 2024 and lasted almost two years.
In the meantime, Couchie told The Narwhal, she fielded concerns about groundwater and lake contamination from residents living close to the site or to a nearby property owned by Ontario’s Ministry of Transportation that also stored the low-level radioactive tailings. Couchie said she struggled to get satisfactory answers from government agencies.
“The workers wore hazmat suits, and I remember saying from the beginning, ‘How can I tell people they have nothing to worry about when these guys are in full on suits?’ They’re literally 20 feet from someone’s window,” Couchie said. The majority of the workers remediating the site were from the nation, and dressed in protective gear so as not to carry radioactive dust home on their clothes.
The plan was to load the waste into trucks to be transported to a tailings management area at Agnew Lake, in Sudbury District. It is the decommissioned site of a former mine, near the Township of Nairn and Hyman, and about 150 kilometres from Nipissing First Nation. The nation first had to excavate nearly 50,000 metric tonnes of the radioactive material — enough to build the Statue of Liberty, twice.
But the project faced another unexpected delay. The province had attempted to relocate the waste without consulting the Nairn community, sparking public outcry. Locals organized public meetings to raise awareness and ultimately stop the transfer.
Eventually, in July 2025 — after nearly a year of advocacy in Nairn, and delay for Nipissing First Nation — the province capitulated, finding another place for the waste to go. This was welcome news for Nipissing First Nation, which is now hoping to transform the scarred land into a lakeside green space for the community to enjoy after years of worry.
“We just wanted to see this material moved off [Nipissing First Nation] lands, and so it was an unexpected disappointment that things were delayed like they were,” Couchie said. “We were pleased that they did end up finding another disposal site.”
“But,” Couchie said, it was “eye opening as well, that there was only one other facility in Ontario that was prepared to accept this.”
That facility is close to another Indigenous community — Aamjiwnaang First Nation, in the Sarnia region, where emissions from refineries and petrochemical plants have earned the area the moniker “Chemical Valley.”
Sarnia facility accepting radioactive waste from Nipissing
The new destination for the radioactive tailings is Clean Harbors, a hazardous waste facility in Corunna, Ont. — 645 kilometres from its original dumping ground. It’s close to both Aamjiwnaang and Sarnia, which have experienced persistent air quality issues related to nearby industry.
Clean Harbors is the only government-licensed hazardous waste management complex in Ontario, and is “uniquely positioned,” its website reads, to offer safe disposal of naturally occurring radioactive material like the niobium tailings.
But the facility’s history is dotted with dust-ups over environmental safety. In 2013, neighbours of the Clean Harbors site won a civil lawsuit over the impact of the waste facility’s emissions on their health and daily lives.
In 2019 the company was fined $100,000 for discharging contaminated smoke after a filter cloth soaked with coolant, oils and metal particles caught fire.
When the province conducted a study on environmental stressors in the Sarnia area in 2023, it found that while the majority of the 870 reports from residents about industrial pollution were related to petrochemical industries and refineries, a significant minority — 219 — were “related to the waste incineration facility in the area (Clean Harbors).”
And in 2025, the Ministry of Environment fined Clean Harbors $100,000 for failing to comply with an equipment requirement for monitoring the excavation of a waste-holding basin.
Clean Harbors did not respond to The Narwhal’s questions about these claims and findings.
In a section of their 2025 annual report on legal, environmental and regulatory compliance risks, Clean Harbors asserted: “We are now, and may in the future be, a defendant in lawsuits brought by parties alleging environmental damage, personal injury and/or property damage, which may result in our payment of significant amounts.”
Aamjiwnaang First Nation Chief Janelle Nahmabin told The Narwhal she had not received any information about the niobium waste that was trucked to Clean Harbors nearly a year ago. Other environmental groups The Narwhal reached out to, including Climate Action Sarnia-Lambton, had not heard of this waste transfer, either.
“The plan now has been executed in a very different way,” said Brennain Lloyd, project coordinator at Northwatch, a northeastern Ontario environmental advocacy group. “It’s moving the waste into the territory of another First Nation that is already heavily impacted by all of the industrial activities.”
‘Under a real nuclear shadow’: radioactive waste in northern Ontario
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. https://thenarwhal.ca/northern-ontario-radioactive-waste-sarnia/
Yukon and Ontario and SMRs – Memorandum of Misunderstanding?
The Yukon public and their elected representatives may not fully understand the implications of introducing small modular nuclear reactors into their electricity mix.
The governments of Yukon and Ontario recently signed a partnership agreement to share Ontario’s expertise about energy development, which includes evaluation of small modular and micro-reactors. The Yukon wants to reduce reliance on diesel while meeting increasing electricity demand.
There are glaring problems with this memorandum of understanding.
First: the Ontario government cannot share what it doesn’t know. There has not been a single successful commercial SMR built worldwide. Construction of the much-touted Darlington New Nuclear Project in Ontario has barely begun.
Second: There is little private investment interest in this technology due to:
- the extraordinarily high cost ($7.7 billion for the first BWRX-300 SMR at Darlington),
- long timeline to completion (nuclear reactors have taken years longer than expected to build.)
- risks associated with accidents
Third: The Ontario public bears the full cost of building and maintaining Ontario’s reactors, remediating environmental damage, the costs of decommissioning reactors at their end of life, and management of the radioactive waste for which there is no feasible solution. Can Yukon afford this expensive electricity source?
Fourth: Nuclear reactors are notoriously unreliable; some are offline for long periods of time, like Point Lepreau in New Brunswick (which operated only 27% of the time in the 2024-2025 fiscal year), requiring diesel or gas backup to meet electricity demands.
Assessing Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs) in Canada
20 April 26, https://cedar-project.org/roadmap/
In 2018, Canada published a strategic plan – a roadmap – to develop small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) across the country. An SMR is one designed to generate 300 megawatts (MW) of electricity or less, compared to Canada’s existing CANDU power reactors which generate 500 MW or more.
According to the “SMR Roadmap,” the first demonstration SMR was expected to be operating in 2026. In this milestone year, our report analyzes the financial and developmental status of the 10 SMR designs with some kind of presence in Canada.
On this page are the report and the recording of the report launch webinar on March 18, 2026.
The report authors are Susan O’Donnell, PhD, St. Thomas University and M.V. Ramana, PhD, University of British Columbia. The report was published by the CEDAR research project at St. Thomas University.
Report launch webinar
The SMRs report was launched during a webinar on March 18, 2026, An assessment of SMR projects: the case of Canada. The speakers were the report authors, Susan O’Donnell, PhD, St. Thomas University and M.V. Ramana, PhD, University of British Columbia with moderator Madis Vasser, PhD, Senior expert on SMRs for Friends of the Earth Estonia.
The event was hosted by Nuclear Transparency Watch in Paris and co-hosted by the Sustainability Learning Lab at St. Thomas University in Fredericton.
The webinar recording, below, was published by the NB Media Co-op, a CEDAR project partner.
Could a New Nuclear Reactor Double or Triple Electricity Rates in New Brunswick?
The implication of these experiences and proposals is that a new 1,000-MW reactor for New Brunswick could carry a price tag of $15 to $26 billion. Estimates of the costs of electricity needed to cover the capital costs of new nuclear plants, if they’re financed through electricity rates, range from the mid-20¢ to more than 40¢ per kilowatt-hour—nearly double to even triple current consumer electricity costs in New Brunswick. Such increases would undermine energy affordability, economic competitiveness, and any plans for decarbonization through electrification.
April 9, 2026, Mark Winfield and Susan O’Donnell, https://www.theenergymix.com/could-a-new-nuclear-reactor-double-or-triple-electricity-rates-in-new-brunswick/
At the end of last month, the NB Power Review Panel report recommended considering building a new large nuclear reactor at the Point Lepreau site in New Brunswick. That recommendation raises a series of questions, not least whether the province can afford a new reactor, how it would be paid for, and its impact on electricity rates and the province’s overall financial position.
It is important to grasp the scale of such a project and its potential economic impacts. Based on recent experience in other jurisdictions, a new large reactor of the types likely to be considered for Lepreau could cost between $15 and $26 billion. That would be a far higher capital expenditure than the original Point Lepreau reactor, which itself came in at more than $5 billion in 2026 dollars.
If the cost of a new reactor were passed on directly to NB Power customers through electricity rates, those rates could double or even triple.
Already, the costs of the original construction and later refurbishment of New Brunswick’s existing reactor at Lepreau make up $3.6 billion of the utility’s current crippling debt, the NB Power Review noted. That debt, plus the fact that the reactor has been operating below capacity since the refurbishment, is costing ratepayers dearly.
But despite New Brunswick’s costly nuclear experience, a new reactor has been in the cards since 2023, when NB Power and the provincial government published plans calling for 600 megawatts (MW) of new nuclear power by 2035 at the Point Lepreau site on the Bay of Fundy.
The original plan was to build two small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). After spending almost $130 million in public funds for SMR activities, New Brunswick found it couldn’t attract the private investment the designs needed to move forward.
The NB Power Review Panel strongly advised against SMRs, echoing a statement by Energy Minister René Legacy six months ago. He rejected the notion of building first-of-a-kind SMRs because of the technological and economic risks associated with their incomplete and unproven designs.
Instead, the review panel recommended that the province consider “initiating the planning assessment phase for an additional large scale, proven technology nuclear plant to be sited alongside the Point Lepreau facility.”
The last new full-scale nuclear reactor project in Canada, the Darlington nuclear power plant east of Toronto, was completed more than 30 years ago. The enormous cost overruns on that project contributed significantly to the effective bankruptcy of the province’s utility, Ontario Hydro, leading to its eventual break-up.
As the memories of these previous experiences with large nuclear construction projects have faded, new projects are now being proposed in Ontario and Alberta. These projects, and experiences with the handful of new-build nuclear projects initiated in Europe and the United States in the last two decades, give us some indication of the reactor options, and their potential costs, for New Brunswick.
At the end of last month, the NB Power Review Panel report recommended considering building a new large nuclear reactor at the Point Lepreau site in New Brunswick. That recommendation raises a series of questions, not least whether the province can afford a new reactor, how it would be paid for, and its impact on electricity rates and the province’s overall financial position.
It is important to grasp the scale of such a project and its potential economic impacts. Based on recent experience in other jurisdictions, a new large reactor of the types likely to be considered for Lepreau could cost between $15 and $26 billion. That would be a far higher capital expenditure than the original Point Lepreau reactor, which itself came in at more than $5 billion in 2026 dollars.
If the cost of a new reactor were passed on directly to NB Power customers through electricity rates, those rates could double or even triple.
Already, the costs of the original construction and later refurbishment of New Brunswick’s existing reactor at Lepreau make up $3.6 billion of the utility’s current crippling debt, the NB Power Review noted. That debt, plus the fact that the reactor has been operating below capacity since the refurbishment, is costing ratepayers dearly.
But despite New Brunswick’s costly nuclear experience, a new reactor has been in the cards since 2023, when NB Power and the provincial government published plans calling for 600 megawatts (MW) of new nuclear power by 2035 at the Point Lepreau site on the Bay of Fundy.
The original plan was to build two small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). After spending almost $130 million in public funds for SMR activities, New Brunswick found it couldn’t attract the private investment the designs needed to move forward.
The NB Power Review Panel strongly advised against SMRs, echoing a statement by Energy Minister René Legacy six months ago. He rejected the notion of building first-of-a-kind SMRs because of the technological and economic risks associated with their incomplete and unproven designs.
Instead, the review panel recommended that the province consider “initiating the planning assessment phase for an additional large scale, proven technology nuclear plant to be sited alongside the Point Lepreau facility.”
The last new full-scale nuclear reactor project in Canada, the Darlington nuclear power plant east of Toronto, was completed more than 30 years ago. The enormous cost overruns on that project contributed significantly to the effective bankruptcy of the province’s utility, Ontario Hydro, leading to its eventual break-up.
As the memories of these previous experiences with large nuclear construction projects have faded, new projects are now being proposed in Ontario and Alberta. These projects, and experiences with the handful of new-build nuclear projects initiated in Europe and the United States in the last two decades, give us some indication of the reactor options, and their potential costs, for New Brunswick.
In Ontario and Alberta, two reactor designs, the CANDU MONARK and the Westinghouse Electric AP1000, have been considered for the expansion of the Bruce Nuclear power plant on Lake Huron, a proposed 10,000-MW Ontario Power Generation plant at Wesleyville on Lake Ontario, and the proposed 4,800-MW Peace River Nuclear Project in Alberta.
The 1,000-MW CANDU MONARK, intended as a successor to the existing CANDU reactors in Ontario and New Brunswick, is owned by Montreal-based multinational AtkinsRéalis (formerly known as SNC Lavalin). Although it’s being aggressively promoted to potential international customers, the MONARK design remains incomplete. The situation has already led the Alberta project’s proponents to switch their proposal to favour the AP1000 design by Westinghouse Electric.
Westinghouse is a U.S.-based company owned by two Canadian firms: infrastructure developer Brookfield Renewable Partners; and uranium miner Cameco Corporation.
Cost information is available on the AP1000 reactor, as two units were completed in 2024 at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia. The total estimated cost of those two 1,100-MW reactors was US$36 billion, or about $26 billion per reactor in 2026 Canadian dollars. The plant has been described as “the most expensive power plant ever built on Earth.” When it went into service, Vogtle resulted in a nearly 24% increase in Georgia Power’s electricity rates, the largest jump in the utility’s history.
AtkinsRéalis is currently pitching the CANDU MONARK to Poland, with a reported estimated cost of $45 to $50 billion for a three-reactor plant, or about $15 billion per unit. The company has also proposed an “Enhanced CANDU 6” design, an updated version of the existing plant at Point Lepreau.
The implication of these experiences and proposals is that a new 1,000-MW reactor for New Brunswick could carry a price tag of $15 to $26 billion. Estimates of the costs of electricity needed to cover the capital costs of new nuclear plants, if they’re financed through electricity rates, range from the mid-20¢ to more than 40¢ per kilowatt-hour—nearly double to even triple current consumer electricity costs in New Brunswick. Such increases would undermine energy affordability, economic competitiveness, and any plans for decarbonization through electrification.
The province could also try to finance the costs through its general tax base. That is the approach that Ontario seems to be taking, at an estimated cost to the provincial treasury of $7 to $8.5 billion per year. Electricity subsidies now account for more than half of Ontario’s deficit, exceeding annual capital expenditures on education and health care by wide margins.
In New Brunswick, the annual costs of that approach, even spread over the decade or more of construction, could exceed the province’s current, record $1.39 billion deficit, and match or exceed its entire annual capital spending plans in all other areas. Adding the cost to New Brunswick Power’s current $6-billion debt would further cripple the utility and likely put it on a path to the kind of de facto bankruptcy that befell Ontario Hydro.
In addition to the financial risks for New Brunswick, a single large reactor project would repeat and magnify a key problem associated with the original Lepreau project—putting an even higher portion of the province’s electricity supply eggs in a single, very expensive and high-risk basket.
The delivery of the NB Power Review Panel report gives New Brunswick an opportunity to reflect on its future electricity pathways. Those directions need to emphasize affordability, decarbonization and sustainability, reliability, and the capacity to adapt to changing economic, technological, and geopolitical circumstances. A single large nuclear project is unlikely to meet those criteria.
Mark Winfield is a professor at the Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change at York University in Toronto, and co-chair of the faculty’s Sustainable Energy Initiative. Susan O’Donnell is adjunct research professor and lead researcher on the CEDAR project in Sustainability and Environmental Studies at St. Thomas University.
Protecting Our Wells: The Rural Costs of Uranium Exploration in Rural Nova Scotia – Alan Timberlake.
Those risks are not hypothetical. Dr. Bertell’s research showed that even low‑level internal exposure—from inhaled dust, dissolved uranium in drinking water, or radon gas—can cause cellular and genetic damage. She documented increased cancer rates, reproductive harm, immune system impacts, and long‑term generational effects in populations exposed to what regulators often describe as “safe” or “acceptable” doses.
April 4, 2026. Citizens Against Uranium Exploration and Mining in Nova Scotia, Alan Timberlake
Upper Tantallon, Nova Scotia
Protecting Our Wells: The Rural Costs of Uranium Exploration in Rural Nova Scotia – Alan Timberlake
For rural Nova Scotians, clean well water isn’t a luxury—it’s our lifeline. It’s what we drink, cook with, bathe in, and give to our animals. That’s why the province’s decision on March 26, 2025 to repeal the long‑standing ban on uranium exploration has raised so many alarms in communities like ours. When your home depends on groundwater, any activity that disturbs uranium‑bearing rock is not an abstract policy issue. It’s personal.
At this time in Nova Scotia, it’s important to remember the work of Dr. Rosalie Bertell (1929–2012), one of the world’s leading experts on low‑level radiation. I first met Dr. Bertell in the early 1980s after helping facilitate her participation as an intervener at the British Columbia Royal Commission on Uranium Mining in Vancouver. Her testimony there helped shape BC’s decision to maintain its moratorium on uranium mining—a position the province still holds today. She was a meticulous epidemiologist and cancer researcher, and her warnings about internal radiation exposure remain deeply relevant to Nova Scotia’s current debate.
British Columbia’s stance today stands in sharp contrast to Nova Scotia’s recent repeal. BC continues to enforce a province‑wide moratorium on uranium exploration and mining through a “no‑registration reserve” that prohibits staking, exploration, or development of uranium or thorium. Even as the federal government promotes uranium as a critical mineral, BC has deliberately excluded it from its own critical minerals strategy. The province where Dr. Bertell’s evidence helped shape policy has stayed the course—while Nova Scotia has moved in the opposite direction.
Nova Scotians have not been silent about this shift. On October 3, 2025, a petition with 7,000 signatures was formally tabled in the Legislature calling for the ban to be reinstated. More petitions are still being circulated across the province. The speed and scale of this response show just how deeply people—especially rural residents—understand the risks.
Those risks are not hypothetical. Dr. Bertell’s research showed that even low‑level internal exposure—from inhaled dust, dissolved uranium in drinking water, or radon gas—can cause cellular and genetic damage. She documented increased cancer rates, reproductive harm, immune system impacts, and long‑term generational effects in populations exposed to what regulators often describe as “safe” or “acceptable” doses.
For rural Nova Scotia, the concern is straightforward: exploration drilling can mobilize uranium into groundwater. Our geology is fractured. Water moves unpredictably underground. A 2018 provincial review found that drilled wells in Nova Scotia have a significantly higher chance of uranium contamination than dug wells. When you rely on a well, there is no backup system. No municipal treatment plant. No alternative supply. Once a well is contaminated, the options are limited, expensive, and often ineffective.
The province insists that modern exploration is “low‑impact.” But rural residents know that the first impacts are often invisible. A slight shift in groundwater flow. A small increase in dissolved uranium. A rise in radon levels in a basement. These changes don’t announce themselves with fanfare—they show up in water tests, in health statistics, or in the lived experience of families who suddenly can’t drink from their own taps.
Despite the government’s enthusiasm, no companies submitted proposals during the initial call for exploration. Even the premier later admitted the push for uranium exploration appears to be “kind of toast right now.” But the repeal remains in place, and the regulatory door is open.
That’s why Dr. Bertell’s work matters so much today. She taught us that low‑level radiation is not benign, and that internal exposure—especially through water—carries risks that can unfold over decades. For rural communities, that means we need independent science, transparent monitoring, and a real voice in decisions that affect our wells.
Cenovus pulled the plug on its much-ballyhooed ‘multi-year’ study of ‘small modular reactors’ in 2024 after a year.
So-called SMRs – which some say should stand for Spending Money Recklessly – aren’t ready for prime time, and probably never will be.
by David Climenhaga, March 28, 2026, https://albertapolitics.ca/2026/03/cenovus-pulled-the-plug-on-its-much-ballyhooed-multi-year-study-of-small-modular-reactors-in-2024-after-a-year/
Despite getting a much-ballyhooed $7-million in start-up costs from the Alberta Government in 2023, a year later Cenovus Energy Inc. pulled the plug on its study of the potential for so-called small modular reactors to generate power to wring oil from Alberta’s oilsands.
To the company’s credit, it only spent $555,000 of the public’s money on the project before losing interest.
The termination of the study was done so quietly, no one seems to have noticed. At least, there appear to have been no news reports about the project’s cancellation.
As recently as last year, though, new references could still be found to the tale told in the Sept. 19, 2023, press release published by Emissions Reduction Alberta (ERA), the Alberta Government office set up in 2009 to fund “Alberta-based technologies that lower emissions and costs for industries.”
That press release enthusiastically announced that the province would provide $7 million through ERA “for Cenovus Energy to conduct a preliminary, multi-year study on whether small modular nuclear reactors (SMR) can be safely, technically, and economically deployed in Alberta’s oil sands operations. Funding will be provided through the Technology Innovation and Emissions Reduction (TIER) fund.”
The release quoted then Environment Minister Rebecca Schulz, who announced the funding at the at the World Petroleum Congress in Calgary, rhapsodizing, “a few years ago, the idea of expanding nuclear energy use was on the back burner – that is no longer the case.
“In Alberta, small modular nuclear reactors have the potential to supply heat and power to the oil sands, simultaneously reducing emissions and supporting Alberta’s energy future,” Ms. Schulz’s canned quote continued. “This funding is the foundation for that promising future. I want to thank Cenovus Energy and Emissions Reduction Alberta for their leadership in this work.”
“We are optimistic about the opportunities ahead and will continue working with industry to explore and enable small modular reactor development in this province,” said Energy Minister Brian Jean, playing second fiddle as he so often did when Ms. Schulz was involved, in the same release.
A CBC News report at the time quoted Ms. Schulz saying, “this is just another example of how industry dollars are being reinvested back into industry to support innovation in emissions reduction.” The CBC story also noted that that the study was “actually a four-year series of studies being lumped into one” with a total estimated cost of $26.7 million.
It would appear, however, that Cenovus quickly reconsidered that kind of spending on that particular topic. Presumably sometime in early 2025, ERA updated a statement on its website revealing that Cenovus had ended the SMR FEED Study ahead of schedule. (FEED stands for “Front End Engineering Design.”)
The undated statement, presumably unchanged from whenever it was first published, devotes 665 words to describing the project and its potential benefits. A line at the top summarizing the project’s status lists it without further comment as “terminated” and indicates that only $555,000 of the promised $7 million from the province was spent.
That page in turn provides a link to Cenovus’s SMR FEED Study Final Outcomes Report, which was published on New Year’s Eve 2024.
A report last week assessing the success of Canada’s 2018 strategic plan to develop SMRs across the country published by researchers Susan O’Donnell and M.V. Ramana for the CEDAR Project (Contesting Energy Discourses through Action Research) cited the Cenovus Final Outcomes Report.
Cenovus’s assessment of the potential for SMRs in Alberta’s oilsands was not enthusiastic.
“Cenovus decided in 2024 (during the execution of phase 1 work) not to continue with the Program beyond the end of 2024,” the company’s report says under the heading Lessons Learned.
“The phase 1 evaluation of nuclear from a business perspective showed SMRs are not economic or commercially feasible at present or in the near future,” the section continued. “The capital costs are high, the timelines are long and uncertain, and technology and supply chains lack maturity. While there is a potential application for industrial heat needs, significant progress in these areas is required, which may not happen for several years.”
Under the heading economic evaluation, the report reaches the conclusion that while it may be technically possible to use SMRs to provide steam for the Steam-Assisted Gravity Drainage oilsands recovery technique, “they are not viable under current market conditions.”
Quite possibly cutting to the fundamental basis of the company’s decision, that section continues: “While existing government support programs are beneficial, they do not provide sufficient financial and risk management support to appropriately improve SMR feasibility.”
In other words, if the government isn’t going to pay for it, we can forget about it.
As for SMRs, despite the relentless effort by Alberta’s United Conservative Party Government to generate enthusiasm for their potential in the Athabasca oilsands, they’re not ready for prime time and quite possibly never will be.
Remember, as has been said here before, SMRs may be nuclear reactors, but they’re not small and they’re not really modular. They are multi-billion-dollar megaprojects, just not mega enough to justify their cost. The initials could stand for “Spending Money Recklessly,” Dr. O’Donnell and Dr. Ramana wrote last Monday.
Like other carbon reduction schemes pushed by the UCP Government, such as its failed hydrogen-powered truck fantasy and high-risk carbon capture and underground storage schemes that are now stirring up opposition in northern Alberta, they serve mainly as a way to to greenwash high-carbon oilsands activities.
1 This Month
10 June – Assessing Canada’s Investments in Small Modular Nuclear Reactors – https://zoom.us/meeting/register/IiqHA5feRhaEBycOLNTJlA#/registration
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